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LASTING LEGISLATION
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†

This Article argues that, due to certain pathologies of the legislative
process, legislation enacted with sunset provisions lacks benefits hailed in recent
scholarship while also harming the political process and its output. Proponents
have argued that such “temporary legislation” enhances fiscal responsibility because official-cost estimates reflect the full cost of the legislation. The cost estimates, in other words, relay the entirety of expenses to Congress upon each sunset date. In contrast, when enacting nontemporary legislation, the theory goes,
Congress receives official costs only for the duration of the budget window, or
the length of time set forth in the annual budget resolution, as the relevant period within which Congress makes spending and revenue decisions.
This theory is flawed. Many factors—shifting baselines, exceptions to the
revenue offset or “pay as you go” rules, costs that temporary legislation engenders beyond the budget window, and the ability of lawmakers to consider
the full cost of legislation—thwart the theoretical fiscal restraint of temporary
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legislation. Nor do sunset provisions tend to provide lawmakers with enhanced
information or flexibility, as proponents of temporary legislation have argued;
instead, lawmakers likely will be unable to determine the appropriateness of
the sunset, or its most effective scope and length. Furthermore, “pro-temporary
legislation” scholars understate the costs of such legislation because temporary
legislation increases rents from interest groups, entrenches current majoritarian
preferences, and produces planning conundrums for public and private actors
alike. Accordingly, this Article recommends a policy presumption against temporary legislation and in favor of legislation that does not expire by its own
terms, or “lasting legislation.” This presumption should be stronger in the context of provisions made temporary due to budgetary constraints, where the identified concerns are more likely to arise, and weaker in emergency or experimental
situations, where the identified concerns are less likely to exist.
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INTRODUCTION
This Article sets forth a view of the legislative process that accounts
for the endogenous nature of the rules that govern it—that is to say,
the enforcement of the rules governing the proposal, debate, and
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adoption of legislation depends largely upon powers vested within, ra1
ther than without, Congress. Although Congress may adopt mechanisms—budget rules, for example—with lofty ambitions to legislate in
the public interest and to promote fiscal responsibility, Congress is all
but unfettered in its ability to sidestep these mechanisms when it sees
2
fit. The endogenous nature of these rules, moreover, is not merely of
academic interest in view of the constant and intense political pressures on Congress to spend overly and unwisely. Indeed, the endo3
geneity of the legislative process causes these political pressures to operate on hydraulics: although the pressures may be blocked at one
channel, their power can still be exerted via another route.
This starting point—that Congress governs the legislative process,
if at all, through inherently weak, self-enforced rules—has substantial
implications for the scholarly debate over “temporary legislation.”
Specifically, this Article finds implausible recent claims that legislation
4
enacted with sunset provisions, or temporary legislation, encourages
fiscal restraint and deliberative decisionmaking. Instead, the endogenous model outlined above predicts that, when encouraged by political pressures, legislators can elude the sunset provisions’ restraints
on their behavior—a prediction borne out time and again by experience. But temporary legislation is worse than ineffective: such legislation creates serious political-economy concerns, entrenchment
problems, and planning disruptions. For these reasons, this Article
recommends a policy presumption against temporary legislation in

1

See Rebecca M. Kysar, Listening to Congress: Earmark Rules and Statutory Interpretation, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 519, 553-62 (2009) (exploring the endogenous nature of legislative rules through an analysis of Supreme Court and lower federal court case law).
2
See, e.g., Ittai Bar-Siman-Tov, Lawmakers as Lawbreakers, 52 WM. & MARY L. REV.
805, 808 (2010) (arguing that Congress lacks the ability and incentives to enforce the
“law of congressional lawmaking” upon itself).
3
Some scholars have argued that legislators enact rules behind a Rawlsian “veil of
ignorance” that forces them to formulate rules in the interests of society, rather than
in their own. See, e.g., Elizabeth Garrett, The Purposes of Framework Legislation, 14 J.
CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 717, 739 (2005); Adrian Vermeule, Veil of Ignorance Rules in
Constitutional Law, 111 YALE L.J. 399, 403-05 (2001). Specifically, legislators adopt rules
without identifying who precisely will benefit or suffer from them—that is, in something like an “original position.” Vermeule, supra, at 399. Although normatively attractive, this account lacks descriptive power. Because legislative rules are endogenous, they are subject to change and easily evaded by legislators.
4
I use the term “sunset provisions” to mean those clauses that cause legislation to
expire by its own terms. This definition is derived from Black’s Law Dictionary, which
defines a “sunset law” as a “statute under which a governmental agency or program
automatically terminates at the end of a fixed period unless it is formally renewed.”
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1574 (9th ed. 2009).
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most cases, replaced with a presumption in favor of legislation that
5
does not expire by its own terms, or “lasting legislation.”
Troublingly, however, Congress has escalated the use of temporary legislation; sunset provisions allow members of Congress to enact
low-cost legislation and to avoid triggering rules that attempt to enforce budget constraints. At the beginning of the most recent century, for example, more than one hundred sunset provisions threatened tax legislation with automatic cessation, including some of the
6
largest tax cuts in American history. In comparison, only a decade
prior, in the early 1990s, less than two dozen relatively inconsequen7
tial tax provisions were set to expire.
Due to economic pressures and legislative rules that substantially
favor the (apparent) low revenue costs of temporary legislation, the
8
use of sunset provisions in the tax context is rampant. The consequences of Congress’s increasing reliance on temporary legislation
soon became clear at the end of 2010, when legislators renewed important pieces of tax legislation, such as the estate-tax repeal and the
9
tax-rate reductions on dividends and capital gains. Evaluation of
5

I have chosen “lasting legislation” as the label for legislation that does not expire
by its own terms, as opposed to the more common term, “permanent legislation,” in
order to highlight that such legislation need not continue indefinitely and, indeed, the
legislature is unlikely to conceive of it as such.
6
See STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 111TH CONG., LIST OF EXPIRING FEDERAL TAX PROVISIONS, 2009–2020 (Comm. Print 2010) (listing 251 expiring provisions). Sixty-nine provisions were due to expire in 2010 alone. Id. at 14-26.
7
See STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 102D CONG., DESCRIPTION OF TAX PROVISIONS EXPIRING IN 1991 AND 1992 (Comm. Print 1991) (listing fifteen expiring provisions); STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 101ST CONG., DESCRIPTION OF TAX PROVISIONS EXPIRING IN 1990 (Comm. Print 1990) (listing eighteen expiring provisions).
8
Shortly after the palpable rise in sunset provisions, I critiqued their impact on
the budget process and the political economy. See Rebecca M. Kysar, The Sun Also Rises:
The Political Economy of Sunset Provisions in the Tax Code, 40 GA. L. REV. 335, 339 (2006)
(arguing that sunset provisions do not function as “good government” tools); see also
William G. Gale & Peter R. Orszag, Sunsets in the Tax Code, 99 TAX NOTES 1553, 1554-57
& fig.1 (2003) (describing the prevalence of sunsets in tax legislation, especially in tax
cuts from the past several years); Elizabeth Garrett, Comment, Accounting for the Federal
Budget and Its Reform, 41 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 187, 196-98 (2004) (providing examples of
the effects of sunset provisions on budget rules and fiscal policy decisions); Elizabeth
Garrett & Adrian Vermeule, Transparency in U.S. Budget Process (discussing the role of
transparency in principal-agent relationships and the positive and negative aspects of accountability), in FISCAL CHALLENGES: AN INTERDISCIPLINARY APPROACH TO BUDGET POLICY 68, 77-80 (Elizabeth Garrett et al. eds., 2008) [hereinafter FISCAL CHALLENGES];
Manoj Viswanathan, Note, Sunset Provisions in the Tax Code: A Critical Evaluation and
Prescriptions for the Future, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 656, 658 (2007) (arguing that sunset provisions are used to enact lasting legislation under the guise of temporary legislation).
9
Tax Relief, Unemployment Insurance Reauthorization, and Job Creation Act of
2010, Pub. L. No. 111-312, 124 Stat. 3296 (to be codified at 26 U.S.C.).
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temporary legislation, therefore, remains essential, especially in light
10
of recent scholarship arguing strongly in its favor. Despite the heightened use of sunset provisions and these new defenses asserting their
utility, this Article concludes that lasting legislation remains the preferred route to prudent lawmaking.
Part I of this Article provides a brief historical overview of sunset
provisions, focusing on their most recent incarnation in the Internal
Revenue Code (the “Code”). It then details the lack of external enforcement of legislative rules, concluding that the ensuing easy evasion of such rules in the budget process has caused the rise in tempo11
rary legislation. For instance, sunset provisions reduce the cost of
tax legislation, preventing a member of Congress from challenging
the legislation as readily under “pay as you go” (PAYGO) rules, which
10

See Jacob E. Gersen, Temporary Legislation, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. 247, 298 (2007)
(“Normatively, temporary legislation should not be globally eschewed, and at least in
specific policy domains such as responses to newly recognized risk, there should be a
presumptive preference in favor of temporary legislation.”); George K. Yin, TemporaryEffect Legislation, Political Accountability, and Fiscal Restraint, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 174, 187-94
(2009) (proposing presumption in favor of legislation that has a temporary effect on
the nation’s budget); see also WILLIAM E. SCHEUERMAN, LIBERAL DEMOCRACY AND THE
SOCIAL ACCELERATION OF TIME 142 (2004) (observing that sunsets can help with “legislative obsolescence”); Martin A. Sullivan, False Alarms and Real Problems with Budget
Gimmicks, 99 TAX NOTES 1129, 1132 (2003) (arguing that temporary provisions are not
immune from repeal or expiration and that they must be “paid for” in the future when
and if extended); Bruce Ackerman, Sunset Can Put a Halt to Twilight of Liberty, Op-Ed.,
L.A. TIMES, Sept. 20, 2001, at B15 (arguing that the PATRIOT Act be temporary);
Frank J. Fagan, The Economic Rationale of Sunset Clauses 25 (Summer 2005) (unpublished Master’s thesis, European Master in Law & Economics) (on file with author)
(positing that sunset provisions allow policymakers to adjust efficiently to changing environments); cf. Neal Katyal, Sunsetting Judicial Opinions, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1237,
1244-47 (2004) (advocating for the use of prospective declarations by courts that some
of their opinions will sunset). Professors Gersen and Yin refer to temporary legislation
as temporary and temporary-effect legislation, respectively. See, e.g., Gersen, supra, at
247-48; Yin, supra, at 174. This Article uses the term “temporary legislation” to describe legislation that expires by its own terms or employs sunset provisions. This Article thus describes advocates in support of such provisions as “pro-temporary legislation” scholars. For earlier pro-temporary legislation arguments, see STEPHEN BREYER,
REGULATION AND ITS REFORM 365-68 (1982), which noted that sunset provisions call
for agency-by-agency regulatory reform, but may not always succeed. See also Bruce
Adams, Sunset: A Proposal for Accountable Government, 28 ADMIN. L. REV. 511, 519-21
(1976) (indicating that sunset provisions should incentivize government officials to
evaluate the relevant program); Lewis Anthony Davis, Review Procedures and Public Accountability in Sunset Legislation: An Analysis and Proposal for Reform, 33 ADMIN. L. REV.
393, 407-08 (1981) (listing the qualities of effective sunset legislation); Dan R. Price,
Sunset Legislation in the United States, 30 BAYLOR L. REV. 401, 418-19 (1978) (describing
sunset legislation as a way to offer a “governmental reform system” that “average citizens can understand” and that would improve political accountability).
11
See infra notes 36-54 and accompanying text.
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are legislative rules that require spending decreases or tax increases
12
to offset revenue-reducing legislation.
One predominant argument advanced recently in support of sunset provisions is that the legislative process accounts completely for
the costs of temporary legislation but fails to do so for lasting legislation because the extension of temporary legislation requires congressional action. At the point of extension, the argument goes, Congress
takes into account the full cost of the temporary program. This characteristic is said to be in contrast to lasting legislation, the estimated
costs of which are provided upon its single enactment only for the du13
ration of the budget window, and thus requires no further congressional action to continue the legislation’s effects.
A central problem with this argument for temporary legislation is
that it assumes a proper functioning of background budget constraints. To evaluate the theory in a more realistic scenario, Part II
first explores several features of our byzantine budget process. It asserts that the pro-temporary legislation view depends on the erroneous assumptions that the baseline estimate from which the legislation’s costs are measured will always treat temporary laws as
temporary, that the length of budget windows will be constant, and
that legislators will faithfully apply PAYGO rules to temporary legislation. Unfortunately, nothing binds Congress to such procedural
commitment devices, and, indeed, as will be shown, Congress has reg14
ularly deviated from them precisely in the manner posited.
Part II then demonstrates that temporary legislation often has
economic effects beyond the budget window, even though such legis12

H.R. Res. 5, 112th Cong. § 2(d) (2011) (providing PAYGO provisions for the
House); S. Con. Res. 21, 110th Cong. § 201 (2007) (setting forth the PAYGO “point of
order” for the Senate budget process).
13
The budget window is the length of time covered by the annual budget resolution, which in turn is the structure within which Congress makes spending and revenue decisions. See Cheryl D. Block, Pathologies at the Intersection of the Budget and Tax Legislative Process, 43 B.C. L. REV. 863, 874 (2002) (“[T]he budget resolution serves as a
fiscal blueprint or framework within which Congress makes its substantive decisions . . . .”). The length of the budget window has historically changed as a result of
political preferences. See Kysar, supra note 8, at 345 (noting that Republicans periodically modified the scope of the 2000 budget, switching between five and ten years).
For a discussion of the appropriate length of budget windows, see Alan J. Auerbach,
Budget Windows, Sunsets, and Fiscal Control, J. PUB. ECON. 87, 99-100 (2006), which
noted, “[A]n optimal budget rule is one that places less weight on years further in the
future, over and above normal discounting. This reflects two factors: policies announced for the future may not take effect and, if they do, that their impact will be felt
more by those whom budget rules are intended to protect.”
14
See infra Section II.A.
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15

lation has a formal end date. In such cases, temporary legislation
suffers from the same purported defect as lasting legislation in that
the budget process will not account for costs beyond the budget window. Although pro-temporary legislation scholars have maintained
that temporary legislation can provide an official revenue estimate
equivalent to its full cost and presumably allows Congress to make
smarter decisions, there is currently no external enforcement mechanism to make Congress fully consider this estimate. Thus, even if
accurate and complete cost information regarding temporary legislation is available, there is no guarantee that the estimate will inform
Congress’s decisionmaking. On the other hand, if Congress does
have incentives to consider the costs of legislation, then Part II demonstrates that Congress will likewise have the means to consider the
full cost of lasting legislation, not just its officially stated cost within the
budget window.
Part III then asks whether sunset provisions afford congressional
members an opportunity to review outdated policies and to enact legislation that addresses only temporary concerns, which are two
strengths commonly attributed to temporary legislation. That Part answers the question in the negative, albeit with qualifications. It contends that the breadth and aim of sunset provisions generally cast too
large a net to capture only problematic policies. Moreover, it also
suggests rejection of efforts to limit temporary legislation to policies of
uncertain or temporary significance, due to research that countervails
16
behavioralist justifications for such usage. Part III then concludes
that interest-group pressures often prevent lawmakers from utilizing
information about the temporary legislation in question.
Although one can lodge many of these same critiques against lasting legislation, temporary legislation has substantial, underacknowledged disadvantages, which this Article describes in Part IV. Specifically, the continuous threat of expiration allows Congress to extract
more rents from interest groups through the use of sunset provisions
15

Professor Yin acknowledges this possibility; hence he limits his proposal, which
favors sunsets, to “temporary-effect” legislation as opposed to merely “temporary” legislation. Yin, supra note 10, at 178 n.9. This Article argues that a surprisingly high percentage of temporary legislation produces costs beyond the budget window.
16
See, e.g., BETTER REGULATION TASK FORCE, ANNUAL REPORT 2000–2001, at 19
(2001) (U.K.) (recommending the consideration of sunset clauses in “[r]ules made
under the ‘precautionary principle,’ where there are significant scientific uncertainties
and more information might lead to a different solution”); Gersen, supra note 10, at
268 (“In recent years, experimental economists and cognitive psychologists have highlighted the plethora of cognitive biases that can affect the ways in which individuals
perceive and make decisions about risk.”).
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that require those groups repeatedly to return to the congressional
floor to achieve their goals. Additionally, because continuation of expiring policies commands significant legislative resources, temporary
legislation raises concerns of entrenchment of prior generations’ policies, interfering with a future Congress’s ability to set its own agenda
while also creating an atmosphere of legislative uncertainty that disrupts the planning activities of citizens and government actors.
In light of these concerns, Part V of this Article recommends a
policy preference against temporary legislation and in favor of lasting
legislation, while identifying particular contexts in which this preference should be strongest and those in which it should be weakest.
The problems with temporary legislation are more likely to occur
where legislators employ sunset provisions for revenue concerns, rather than for deliberative or other traditional policy functions, typically in the tax-cutting context. In contrast, sunset provisions enacted in
emergencies or for experimental purposes may avoid many of the
provisions’ harmful tendencies. For instance, a clearly demarcated
crisis situation will make it less necessary for a future legislature to revisit the issue, hence avoiding entrenchment concerns somewhat; and
will make it easier for the legislature to set an appropriate and more
certain sunset date, thereby allaying planning concerns. Additionally,
once a crisis event ends, interest groups may also disband, reducing political-economy considerations. It is possible, however, that interest
groups will successfully lobby for continued benefits beyond those necessitated by the emergency; thus, legislators should still exercise caution in such usage of temporary legislation.
I. BACKGROUND
A. History of Temporary Legislation
Temporary legislation has a long history in American lawmaking,
17
dating back to the Founding Era. Since then, the legislature has applied sunset provisions both narrowly and widely to legislation, government programs, and agency actions. In Federalist No. 26, for example, Alexander Hamilton supported the constitutional restriction of
military appropriations to two-year periods to ensure that there would
17

In prior work, I have traced the use of sunset provisions and will thus do so only
briefly here, focusing particular attention upon recent developments. See Kysar, supra
note 8, at 350-52 (sunset provisions in the Sedition Act of 1798); see also Gersen, supra
note 10, at 250-55 (sunset provisions present in the Federalist Papers and enacted by
the First Congress).
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be renewed deliberation regarding status quo funding and to protect
18
against the public’s short-lived passions. Under Hamilton’s view, the
additional actions required to reenact temporary legislation would
19
protect society from unwise or outdated policy.
Thomas Jefferson also argued famously in favor of sunset provisions in his correspondence with Madison during the French Revolution, going so far as to propose that all laws, including the Constitu20
tion, “naturally expire[] at the end of 19. [sic] years.”
Madison
would later advocate during the Constitutional Convention for the
21
employment of sunset provisions in cases of difficult policy decisions.
Many decades later, while serving as a Securities and Exchange
Commission director in the Roosevelt Administration, William O.
Douglas, influenced by the work of the prominent political theorist
Theodore J. Lowi, would argue that agency capture provided a differ22
ent rationale for the sunsetting of agencies. This view would influence a series of government reforms in the latter half of the twentieth
century. Advocacy groups, such as Common Cause, promoted sunset
23
provisions as a means of dislodging entrenched interest groups.
Building upon Justice Brandeis’s famous description of transparency
rules as “the best disinfectant,” a Common Cause branch president
24
suggested, “My God, we’ve done sunshine, how about sunset?” By
the early 1980s, thirty-five states had enacted sunset laws that man-

18

THE FEDERALIST NO. 26, at 168 (Alexander Hamilton) ( Jacob E. Cooke ed.,

1961).
19

See Gersen, supra note 10, at 251 (remarking that Hamilton believed these “subsequent stages of procedure” acted as a safeguard for the democratic process).
20
Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (Sept. 6, 1789), reprinted in 6
THE WORKS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 3, 9 (Paul Leicester Ford ed., 1904).
21
See 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 587 (Max Farrand
ed., 1911) (recording Madison’s argument that the renewal of sunsetting legislation—
rather than the repeal of lasting legislation—would be more effective in cases involving
difficult policy decisions).
22
See, e.g., WILLIAM O. DOUGLAS, GO EAST, YOUNG MAN, THE EARLY YEARS: THE
AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF WILLIAM O. DOUGLAS 294 (1974) (“After [ten years, an agency] is
likely to become a prisoner of bureaucracy and of . . . inertia . . . . This is why I told FDR
over and over again that every agency he created should be abolished in ten years.”).
23
See Kysar, supra note 8, at 351 (citing THEODORE J. LOWI, THE END OF LIBERALISM: IDEOLOGY, POLICY, AND THE CRISIS OF PUBLIC AUTHORITY 309-10 (1969)). Lowi
argued that the annual appropriations process did not sufficiently guard against excesses of interest-group activity; historically, opposition from congressional members to
appropriations was “disregarded or ruled out of order.” LOWI, supra, at 310.
24
Chris Mooney, A Short History of Sunsets, LEGAL AFF., Jan.–Feb. 2004, at 67, 68
(quoting Craig Barnes).
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dated periodic review of government agencies and other entities.
The vast majority of these broad sunset provisions were eventually
abandoned after lobbying pressures produced reviews that were costly
26
and of questionable utility. Although similar attempts to enact wide27
spread sunsets at the federal level failed, Congress did occasionally
employ sunset provisions to garner support for controversial legisla28
tion and to address various problems identified as temporary.
Since the 1970s, Congress has applied sunset provisions to certain
29
tax provisions, collectively known as “extenders.” Congress renews the
vast majority of extenders upon the sunset date or shortly thereafter on
30
a retroactive basis. Indeed, the popular research and development
25

COMMON CAUSE, THE STATUS OF SUNSET IN THE STATES: A COMMON CAUSE RE(1982).
26
See Kysar, supra note 8, at 354-57, for a summary of the rise and fall of state sunset provisions. See also AM. ENTER. INST. FOR PUB. POLICY RESEARCH, ZERO-BASE BUDGETING AND SUNSET LEGISLATION 31-35 (1978) (listing common arguments against
sunset provisions). A New York Times article reported that Colorado’s sunset law cost
the state $212,000 to review its agencies, while saving the state only $6810 upon the
termination of three small agencies. Facing Facts: High-Priced Sunset, N.Y. TIMES, Apr.
26, 1978, at A24.
27
See Vern McKinley, Sunrises Without Sunsets: Can Sunset Laws Reduce Regulation?,
18 REGULATION, no. 4, 1995, at 57, 59-60 (noting as an example the failed passage of
the Sunset Act of 1977).
28
For instance, provisions in the Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing
Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT
ACT) Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 8, 15, 18, 22, 31, 42, 49, and 50 U.S.C.), which gave expanded enforcement
tactics to the executive, were subject to a four-year sunset provision, id. § 224, 115 Stat.
at 295, due to concerns for individual rights. In a similar example, the Violent Crime
Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, which banned assault weapons, contained a
ten-year sunset provision in order to appease libertarian concerns. Pub. L. No. 103-322,
§ 110105, 108 Stat. 1796, 2000 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 922 (2006)). Congress has also used sunset provisions to address temporary problems. See, e.g., Job Creation and Worker Assistance Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-147, § 301, 116 Stat. 21, 33-40
(codified as amended at I.R.C. § 38 (2006)) (expanding work opportunity tax credit to
benefit New York City employees in the World Trade Center area following the September 11 terrorist attacks but setting a termination date of December 31, 2006).
29
See Kysar, supra note 8, at 358 (describing several well known tax extenders and
their purposes).
30
See Jill Barshay, “Temporary” Tax Breaks Usually a Permanent Reality, CONG. Q.
WKLY., Nov. 15, 2003, at 2831 (noting only one extender provision had expired in the
twenty-five years that Congress had employed them); Ed Kleinbard, Speech to the
American Bar Association (May 7, 2009) (noting that the “entire herd of ‘extenders’ is
paraded through the legislative process as a unit . . . [a]nd just as good cowboys do not
lose many yearlings, it is virtually unheard of for an ‘extender’ to get separated from
the rest of the herd and not get renewed”), as quoted in Ryan J. Donmoyer, Bailout of
U.S. Banks Give British Rum a $2.7 Billion Benefit, BLOOMBERG.COM ( June 26, 2009),
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=amp5wXx35fkc.
Out
of the forty-one tax extenders due to expire in 2007, eleven provisions either expired
PORT i
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(R&D) credit has been temporarily extended numerous times since its
31
inception approximately thirty years ago, typically on a one-year basis.
Beginning in 2001, Congress began to sunset important pieces of
tax legislation in whole. For instance, all provisions of the Economic
Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001 (EGTRRA), which
contained a phased-in repeal of the estate tax, had a sunset date of
32
December 31, 2010. Two years later, Congress applied staggered
sunset dates to most of the Jobs and Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation
33
Act of 2003 ( JGTRRA). For instance, JGTRRA’s reduction of the
dividend and capital-gains rates were scheduled to last until 2009,
while the increased child-tax credit and the marriage-penalty relief
34
provisions were scheduled to sunset at the end of 2004. EGTRRA
and JGTRRA comprise two of the largest tax cuts in the history of the
35
United States.
The proliferation of temporary legislation reflects both process
36
(i.e., budgetary rules) and substance (i.e., fiscal pressures). PAYGO
rules require revenue offsets for new revenue-decreasing legislation,

or were made permanent, and of the twenty-one provisions that were due to expire in
2008, only five expired. Compare STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 110TH CONG.,
LIST OF EXPIRING FEDERAL TAX PROVISIONS, 2007–2020 (Comm. Print 2008), with
STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 111TH CONG., LIST OF EXPIRING FEDERAL TAX
PROVISIONS, 2008–2020 (Comm. Print 2009).
31
See Subcommittee on Contracting and Technology Hearing on Helping Small Business
Innovators Through the Research and Experimentation Tax Credit: Hearing Before the H.
Comm. on Small Bus., 111th Cong. 5 (2009) (statement of Rep. Nye, Chairman, H. Subcomm. on Contracting & Tech.) (“Perhaps the greatest shortcoming in the R&D credit
is its lack of permanence. In the nearly three decades since its inception, the incentive
has never been cemented. Instead, it has been reauthorized 1 year at a time, often at
the last minute, retroactively, and after the credit has expired.”).
32
Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 10716, § 901(a), 115 Stat. 38, 150.
33
Jobs and Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-27,
§§ 107, 303, 117 Stat. 752, 755-56, 764. Most provisions of both JGTRRA and EGTRRA
were extended by the Tax Relief, Unemployment Insurance Reauthorization, and Job
Creation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-312, 124 Stat. 3296 (to be codified at 26 U.S.C.).
34
See Fortney Pete Stark, JEC Report Decries “Short-Sighted” GOP Tax-Cutting Strategy,
TAX NOTES TODAY, May 27, 2003, available at LEXIS, 2003 TNT 102-20 (describing the
bill’s conference agreement).
35
See Jonathan Weisman & Naftali Bendavid, Obama Eyes $300 Billion Tax Cut,
WALL ST. J., Jan. 5, 2009, at A1 (comparing EGTRRA and JGTRRA to a proposed tax
cut by President Obama).
36
A report issued by an independent organization within the IRS, established to
advance the interests and rights of taxpayers, enumerates the categories of budget
rules, including PAYGO rules. See 1 NAT’L TAXPAYER ADVOCATE, 2008 ANNUAL REPORT
TO CONGRESS 401-03 (2008).
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such as mandatory spending or tax cuts. When a congressional colleague fails to provide a revenue offset under an internal PAYGO rule,
opposing legislators may enforce the PAYGO rule as they do other
38
procedural rules of Congress: by raising a “point of order.” If sustained, the point of order will serve to strike the revenue-decreasing
legislation from the bill. The point of order may be waived according
to the procedural rules of each house of Congress, usually by a simple
majority of the Rules Committee in the House or by three-fifths of all
39
members in the Senate. Violations of statutory PAYGO rules can result in sequestration, or a reduction in direct-spending programs, after
the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) determines that the leg40
islation decreases revenues. Sunset provisions reduce the cost of revenue-decreasing legislation and, in this manner, require smaller offsets
under the PAYGO rules. The House and Senate budget committees
calculate the cost of legislation for purposes of the PAYGO rule in a
manner consistent with a now-expired provision of the Balanced
41
Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985. These estimates
ignore sunset provisions for spending programs with current-year

37

For materials cataloging the House and Senate PAYGO rules, see infra note 39.
A point of order is a procedure that allows a member of Congress to contest an
action or a proposed action as a violation of the relevant house’s rules, practices, or
procedures. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1195 (8th ed. 2004) (defining a point of order as a “request suggesting that the meeting or a member is not following the applicable rules and asking the chair to enforce the rules”).
39
See NAT’L TAXPAYER ADVOCATE, supra note 36, at 401 & n.24. The House originally adopted its internal PAYGO rule on January 5, 2007, as part of H.R. Res. 6, 110th
Cong. § 405 (2007). The House adopted the current form of the rule on January 5,
2011. H.R. Res. 5, 112th Cong. § 2(d) (2011). Unlike the Senate and statutory rules,
the House rule applies only to direct spending and excludes tax cuts. Id. The Senate
has had an internal PAYGO rule since 1993 but adopted the current form of the rule
in May 2007 as part of the 2008 budget resolution. See S. Con. Res. 21, 110th Cong.
§ 201 (2007) (adopting a PAYGO point of order). See generally ROBERT KEITH, CONG.
RESEARCH SERV., RL 34300, PAY-AS-YOU-GO PROCEDURES FOR BUDGET ENFORCEMENT 4
(2007) (explaining the background of PAYGO rules in Congress).
40
Statutory Pay-As-You-Go Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-139, § 5, 124 Stat. 8, 15 (to
be codified at 2 U.S.C. § 900 et seq.). This law replaced previous statutory PAYGO
rules that were in effect from 1986 but expired in 2002. See Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-508, tit. XIII, § 13101, 104 Stat. 1388, 1388-581 to
1388-582 (amending the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985,
Pub. L. No. 99-177, tit. II, 99 Stat. 1037).
41
See H.R. Res. 5, 111th Cong. § 2( j) (2009) (requiring that the budgetary effect
be measured against “baseline estimates” from the Congressional Budget Office, “consistent with section 257 of the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of
1985”); S. Con. Res. 21, 110th Cong. § 201(a) (2007) (requiring the same consistency
with the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985 as the House).
38
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costs greater than $50 million, but not for other programs. For purposes of estimation in the tax-cutting context, the committees assume
sunset provisions take effect even though, for the most part, tempo43
rary tax cuts do not expire but instead are routinely renewed. Because of the budgetary estimation practices, a proponent of temporary
legislation will often face a lower risk of sequestration or of a colleague raising a point of order against the legislation.
Reconciliation, part of the budget process, also induces legislators
44
to use sunset provisions. The Congressional Budget Act of 1974 initiated this streamlined alternative lawmaking process, offering Con45
gress a fast track for passing deficit-reducing legislation. Generally, a
reconciliation bill receives the benefit of special procedural rules that
limit debate and thereby eliminate the threat of a filibuster. Under
this process, Congress passes a budget resolution that sets forth a limitation on spending—a so-called “section 302 spending allocation”—
46
for each category of revenue and spending. Any provision that ex47
ceeds the allocation must be packaged with a revenue-raising measure.
Again, points of order enforce the procedural rules that set forth the
mechanics of this process. Because sunset provisions reduce the cost of
revenue-decreasing legislation, they require smaller offsets to meet the
section 302 spending allocations. In estimating costs for purposes of
42

See 2 U.S.C. § 907(b)(2)(A)(i) (2006) (“No program . . . with estimated current
year outlays greater than $50,000,000 shall be assumed to expire in the budget year or
the outyears.”).
43
See Oren Gross, Chaos and Rules: Should Responses to Violent Crises Always Be Constitutional?, 112 YALE L.J. 1011, 1090 (2003) (“Time-bound emergency legislation is often
the subject of future extensions and renewals . . . .”).
44
Note that reconciliation can be used in conjunction with PAYGO rules. In such
cases, there is even greater incentive to use temporary legislation.
45
See Congressional Budget Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-344, § 310(c), 88 Stat. 297,
315-16 (detailing the reconciliation process). For a discussion of the reconciliation
process, see generally Elizabeth Garrett, Rethinking the Structures of Decisionmaking in the
Federal Budget Process, 35 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 387 (1998), Philip G. Joyce & Robert D.
Reischauer, Deficit Budgeting: The Federal Budget Process and Budget Reform, 29 HARV. J.
ON LEGIS. 429 (1992), Anita S. Krishnakumar, Reconciliation and the Fiscal Constitution:
The Anatomy of the 1995–96 Budget "Train Wreck," 35 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 589 (1998), and
James A. Miller & James D. Range, Reconciling an Irreconcilable Budget: The New Politics of
the Budget Process, 20 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 4 (1983).
46
See BILL HENIFF, JR., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS 20144, ALLOCATIONS AND SUBDIVISIONS IN THE CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET PROCESS 1-2 (2003) (detailing the workings
of Congressional Budget Act section 302 in the budgetary process); see also Congressional Budget Act of 1974, § 302, 88 Stat. at 308-09 (requiring an estimated budget allocation with budget resolutions).
47
ROBERT KEITH & BILL HENIFF, JR., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 33030, THE BUDGET RECONCILIATION PROCESS: HOUSE AND SENATE PROCEDURES 15, 40-41, 68 (2005).
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reconciliation, the budget committees look to Congressional Budget
Office (CBO) and Joint Committee on Taxation ( JCT) estimates,
which use the principles of the Balanced Budget and Emergency Defi48
cit Control Act of 1985, as do the PAYGO rules. Like the PAYGO
rules, sunset provisions reduce the threat of points of order, at least
where the sunset date occurs prior to the end of the budget window.
Although the original intent of the reconciliation process was to
provide an easier path to enact deficit-reducing legislation, in 2001,
Republicans won a procedural battle by passing one of the largest tax
cuts in history, EGTRRA, through the reconciliation process in order
to avoid a filibuster. This successful action set a strong congressional
precedent for use of the reconciliation process to pass deficitincreasing legislation. Two years later, a section 302 spending allocation of $350 billion, demanded by centrist legislators, would inspire
congressional Republicans to sunset provisions in JGTRRA, thus
enacting deeper tax cuts than would have been possible had the cuts
49
been permanent.
Another aspect of the reconciliation process, the Byrd Rule, further encourages the use of sunset provisions. Senator Robert Byrd introduced this rule to guard against senators adding unrelated provi50
sions to the reconciliation bill. The Byrd Rule allows senators to raise
a point of order against extraneous provisions, which can be waived
51
only by three-fifths of the Senate. The Byrd Rule lists several categories of extraneous provisions, including reconciliation bills that de48

See Issues in Reinstating a Statutory Pay-As-You-Go Requirement: Hearing Before the H.
Comm. on the Budget, 110th Cong. 12 n.16 (2007) [hereinafter Hearing Before the H.
Comm. on the Budget] (statement of Peter R. Orszag, Director, Congressional Budget
Office) (“The Budget Committees determine all estimates used to enforce Congressional budget procedures. To assist the Budget Committees, CBO analyzes the spending or revenue effects of specific legislative proposals. For proposals that would amend
the Internal Revenue Code, CBO is required by law to use estimates provided by the
Joint Committee on Taxation.”); NAT’L TAXPAYER ADVOCATE, supra note 36, at 403
(noting that PAYGO uses estimates consistent with the 1985 Act).
49
See Charles E. Grassley, Senate Clears Jobs and Growth Package with Dividend Exclusion, TAX NOTES TODAY, May 15, 2003, available at LEXIS, 2003 TNT 103-58 (referencing statements by moderate senators emphasizing that the cost of JGTRRA must not
exceed $350 billion); Stark, supra note 34 (noting that the true cost of the 2001 tax cut
is greater than its official cost because of the use of phase-ins and sunset provisions); see
also MICHAEL J. GRAETZ & IAN SHAPIRO, DEATH BY A THOUSAND CUTS: THE FIGHT OVER
TAXING INHERITED WEALTH 186-205 (2005) (detailing attempts to meet the budget
resolution of $1.35 trillion, including the sunsetting of some of the tax cuts).
50
See Michael W. Evans, The Budget Process and the “Sunset” Provision of the 2001 Tax
Law, 99 TAX NOTES 405, 408-10 (2003) (describing the reasoning behind the Byrd Rule).
51
2 U.S.C. § 644(e) (2006).
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crease revenues beyond the budget window. Because sunset provi53
sions eliminate costs outside the budget window, senators can employ
54
them as safeguards against invocation of the Byrd Rule. For instance,
the conference committee sunsetted the entirety of EGTRRA before
55
the end of the budget window to avoid the Byrd Rule.
Finally, apart from the budget rules, financial constraints also spur
legislators to reduce the estimated costs of legislation. To appease
constituents and their fellow lawmakers, members of Congress may
employ sunset provisions to reduce costs. The success of this strategy
necessarily depends upon whether the threat of sunsetting appears legitimate. If so, lawmakers and constituents will accept the reduced
costs that accompany a shortened time frame of legislation.
B. The Endogeneity of Legislative Rules
In view of the previously discussed budget rules and fiscal pressures, it is unsurprising that legislators have employed sunset provisions with increasing frequency in the United States, particularly in
the tax-cutting context, where revenue concerns are significant. But
this account of the rise of sunsets has an important implication: the
political drivers of recent sunset provisions often differ markedly from
their originally conceived purposes, most prominently those aimed at
56
continuing legislative oversight and engagement.
To understand
this evolution of sunset provisions, it is helpful to situate the budget
process within a larger legal context.
Legislative rules or internal rules that attempt to structure congressional lawmaking and organization primarily govern the budget

52

Id.
This assumes that the sunset period is shorter than the budget window and any
costs of the legislation also do not extend beyond the budget window. Section II.B will
discuss the latter point in detail.
54
See Auerbach, supra note 13, at 99 (“[S]unsets . . . can be understood as optimal responses by governments seeking to satisfy their own spending and borrowing
objectives.”).
55
See Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001, Pub. L. No.
107-16, § 901(a), 115 Stat. 38, 150 (stating that the Act’s provisions will not apply to
any year after 2010).
56
See Kysar, supra note 8, at 350-57, 404 (cataloguing sunset-provision purposes,
such as preventing the entrenchment of outmoded and inefficient programs and curtailing the capture of regulatory agencies by special interests). Another historical purpose of sunset provisions has been one of “intrinsic necessity,” such as the use of time
limits to reward innovation of intellectual property. See Fagan, supra note 10, at 11-13.
53
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57

process.
Each house adopts its own set of legislative rules, upon
58
which few constitutional limitations exist, and over which each house
retains enormous flexibility and can unilaterally change or waive at
59
any time. Generally, legislative rules are enforced only within Congress by points of order, which are issued upon violations of the
60
rules. According to Supreme Court precedent, each house’s authority over its legislative rules derives both from the Rulemaking Clause
of the Constitution, which states that “[e]ach House may determine
61
the Rules of its Proceedings,” and from separation-of-powers con57

Congress may enact legislative rules through statutes rather than resolutions.
The former procedure, of course, requires the other house’s approval and the President’s signature. Because of this external participation, some have argued that the
Rules of Proceedings Clause of the Constitution, art. I, § 5, cl. 2, may bar the enactment of legislative rules through statutes. See, e.g., Adrian Vermeule, The Constitutional
Law of Congressional Procedure, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 361, 430 (2004) (“[I]t is plausibly the
best reading of the Rule of Proceedings Clause that the power of each house to ‘determine the rules of its proceedings’ is exclusive as well as permissive . . . .”). Statutes
that enact legislative rules generally contain clauses whereby each house retains the
ability to change the rules unilaterally. See, e.g., Honest Leadership and Open Government Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-81, § 555, 121 Stat. 735, 774 (enacting internal
rules of the Senate “with full recognition of the constitutional right of the Senate to
change those rules at any time, in the same manner, and to the same extent as in the
case of any other rule of the Senate.”). The courts treat these provisions as endogenous and therefore unreviewable.
58
See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 2, amended by U.S. CONST. amend. XX, § 2
(mandating a minimum annual assembly of Congress); id. art. I, § 7, cl. 1 (requiring
the origination of revenue bills in the House of Representatives); see also Vermeule,
supra note 57, at 430 (reviewing constitutional limitations upon legislative rules).
59
See Rules of the House of Representatives, Rule XV, § 1(a), H.R. Doc. No. 110162, at 662 (2009) (providing that two-thirds of members voting may suspend a rule
because a quorum is present); Standing Rules of the Senate, Rule V, § 1, as reprinted in
S. Doc. No. 110-1, at 5 (2008) (providing that no suspension of a rule generally may
take place without one day’s notice in writing or immediately upon the unanimous
vote of the Senate); Stanley Bach, Legislating: Floor and Conference Procedures in Congress
(noting each house of Congress “is always free” to amend, waive, or repeal its own
rules, even when enacted by statute), in 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE AMERICAN LEGISLATIVE SYSTEM 701, 702 ( Joel H. Silbey ed., 1994).
60
See Michael B. Miller, Comment, The Justiciability of Legislative Rules and the “Political” Political Question Doctrine, 78 CALIF. L. REV. 1341, 1346 (1990) (“A rule is not binding if it is not invoked; the rules have absolutely no effect unless a member brings
them into play.”).
61
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 2; see also, e.g., United States v. Ballin, 144 U.S. 1, 6-9
(1892) (interpreting the Rulemaking clause to prohibit judicial review of a House rule
concerning the constitutional “Quorum to do Business” requirement); Field v. Clark,
143 U.S. 649, 672 (1892) (holding that the Court could not question Congress’s attestation that the bill presented to the President for signature was identical to the one it
passed). Lower federal courts also have held that legislative rules are nonjusticiable.
See Kysar, supra note 1, at 557-60 (canvassing lower federal court case law denying justiciability of legislative rules).

KYSAR REVISED FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2011]

Lasting Legislation

3/14/2011 12:30 PM

1023

cerns. Courts seldom review legislative rules and often capitulate to
62
Congress when they do. Indeed, no federal court has ruled upon the
63
substance of a legislative rule regulating the enactment of legislation.
Nor has any federal court overturned a legislative rule unless the rule
infringed upon individuals’ constitutional rights or ran afoul of other
64
constitutional limitations.
Because they lack external enforcement mechanisms, legislative
65
rules can be described as endogenous to the lawmaking process. Not
66
surprisingly, waivers and violations of the rules are common. Their instability becomes even more apparent after consideration of their use as
67
a quasi-precommitment device. Especially in the budget context, legislators may anticipate difficulty in future self-discipline; for this reason,
they may create legislative rules that bind them to a committed path of
fiscal responsibility, lest they be later tempted by the demands of consti62

See, e.g., United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 176-80 (1974) (holding that
a taxpayer did not have standing to force publication of the budget of the Central Intelligence Agency); Texas Ass’n of Concerned Taxpayers, Inc. v. United States, 772
F.2d 163, 167 (5th Cir. 1985) (holding that Congress’s interpretation of a constitutional provision concerning the internal operation of Congress is “a nonjusticiable political
question”); Gregg v. Barrett, 771 F.2d 539, 543 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (reasoning that separation of powers permitted the court to refuse to decide questions of legislative rules,
under the “equitable discretion” doctrine); Vander Jagt v. O’Neill, 699 F.2d 1166, 1175
(D.C. Cir. 1983) (declining to review the House’s distribution of its committee seats);
Harrington v. Bush, 553 F.2d 190, 195-97, 214 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (holding that a Representative did not have standing to challenge the method of appropriations for the
Central Intelligence Agency, due to concerns about the “intrusion of the courts into
the proper affairs of the coequal branches of government”); Consumers Union of U.S.,
Inc. v. Periodical Correspondents’ Ass’n, 515 F.2d 1341, 1345-46 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (denying judicial review of congressional allocation of press passes).
63
John C. Roberts & Erwin Chemerinsky, Entrenchment of Ordinary Legislation: A
Reply to Professors Posner and Vermeule, 91 CALIF. L. REV. 1773, 1791 (2003).
64
See John C. Roberts, Majority Voting in Congress: Further Notes on the Constitutionality of the Senate Cloture Rule, 20 J.L. & POL. 505, 533 (2004) (describing federal courts’
lack of interference with “purely internal” House or Senate rules that do not raise constitutional concerns).
65
Kysar, supra note 1, at 561.
66
See, e.g., id. at 542-51 (listing deficiencies of and defections from a legislative
rule that requires disclosure of special interest legislation).
67
See id. at 528 (describing certain legislative “earmark” rules as “akin to precommitment devices . . . in weak form”). For other descriptions of legislative rules as precommitment devices, see, for example, Elizabeth Garrett, Harnessing Politics: The Dynamics of Offset Requirements in the Tax Legislative Process, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 501, 512 n.43
(1998), which states that supermajority and other institutional requirements “can operate as precommitment devices to avoid collective action problems that reduce Congress’s ability to achieve preferred policy outcomes.” See also, e.g., Garrett, supra note 3,
at 751 (identifying precommitment as a goal of some legislative rules); Nancy C.
Staudt, Constitutional Politics and Balanced Budgets, 1998 U. ILL. L. REV. 1105, 1117 (labeling a balanced-budget amendment as a precommitment tool).
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tuents or interest groups offering votes and rents in exchange for tax
cuts or spending. However, unlike Jon Elster’s conception of precommitment devices—which require an external force to bind the wavering
68
individual —legislative rules are self-governing and, accordingly, legislators easily evade them. Nonetheless, Congress initially put them into
place with the goal of tempering later pressures to spend or reduce revenues excessively; for that reason, they are a quasi-precommitment device. Because these pressures become so great, however, and because of
the endogeneity of budget rules, defection is common.
Legislators can and will interpret budget rules in a manner that
benefits their current desires for deficit-increasing legislation—for in69
stance, by allowing tax cuts to pass through the reconciliation process.
At other times, pressures to spend or to cut taxes force creative circumvention of the letter of some rules, if not their spirit. For example,
the use of the EGTRRA sunset provisions failed to trigger the technical language of the Byrd Rule since that rule prohibited extraneous
70
legislation that increased deficits beyond the budget window.
Although it is true that Congress, at times, enlists the assistance of
the Executive Branch in effectuating its long-term budget goals, it has
been able to override enforcement mechanisms of that branch. For
instance, the statutory PAYGO rules of the 1990s required that legislators offset any tax cuts or increases in entitlement spending with ac71
companying tax increases or spending cuts.
If Congress did not
meet these requirements, a presidential order for mandatory seques68

See Jon Elster, Don’t Burn Your Bridge Before You Come to It: Some Ambiguities and
Complexities of Precommitment, 81 TEX. L. REV. 1751, 1759-60 (2003) (concluding that
“the individual can enlist others in the effort to bind himself” while “[b]y contrast,
there is nothing external to society” to bind society in its entirety). For the foundational
works in precommitment theory, see JON ELSTER, ULYSSES AND THE SIRENS: STUDIES IN
RATIONALITY AND IRRATIONALITY (1979); JON ELSTER, ULYSSES UNBOUND: STUDIES IN
RATIONALITY, PRECOMMITMENT, AND CONSTRAINTS (2000); THOMAS C. SCHELLING, Ethics, Law, and the Exercise of Self-Command, in CHOICE AND CONSEQUENCE 83, 96-107
(1984); THOMAS C. SCHELLING, The Intimate Contest for Self-Command, in CHOICE AND
CONSEQUENCE 57, 76-82 (1984).
69
See supra notes 44-49 and accompanying text (describing the streamlined reconciliation procedures). After the Senate Parliamentarian, the advisor for interpretations of Senate procedure, expressed doubts about the use of reconciliation for tax
cuts, party leaders promptly fired him in an unprecedented event. Charles Tiefer,
How to Steal a Trillion: The Uses of Laws About Lawmaking in 2001, 17 J.L. & POL. 409,
412 (2001).
70
See supra notes 50-55 and accompanying text (explaining the procedural requirements of the Byrd Rule).
71
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-580, tit. XIII,
§ 13101, 104 Stat. 1388, 1388-574 to 1388-583 (codified as amended at 2 U.S.C. § 900–
903 (2000)).
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tration—an automatic reduction in certain nonexempt categories of
72
mandatory spending—would be issued. Sequestration, however, was
73
never ordered while the PAYGO rules were in effect. Instead, Congress discovered ways to avoid sequestration. For instance, in order to
enact EGTRRA without triggering sequestration, a conference report
required the entity responsible for PAYGO accounting, the OMB, to
74
zero out PAYGO balances in 2001 and 2002. In total, when statutory
PAYGO rules were in effect, Congress enacted seven laws that altered
75
PAYGO balances. These examples illustrate the fragility of the budget process, which again stems from the endogeneity of legislative rules
76
and the political appetite for government spending and tax cuts.

72

Id.
Hearing Before the H. Comm. on the Budget, supra note 48, at 5 (statement of Peter
R. Orszag, Director, Congressional Budget Office).
74
H.R. REP. NO. 107-350, at 114 (2002) (Conf. Rep.); see also Block, supra note 13,
at 866 (discussing Congress’s avoidance of a 1999 sequester using a similar technique).
75
The seven laws are the following: Reduction of Preexisting PAYGO Balances,
Pub. L. No. 107-312, § 1, 116 Stat. 2456, 2456 (2002); Department of Defense and
Emergency Supplemental Appropriations for Recovery from and Response to Terrorist
Attacks on the United States Act, 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-117, § 102, 115 Stat. 2230,
2342; Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2001, Pub. L. No. 106-554, § 2, 114 Stat. 2763,
2763-64; Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2000, Pub. L. 106-113, §§ 1001(a)–(c), 113
Stat. 1501, 1536-37; Balanced Budget Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-33, § 10213, 111
Stat. 251, 712; Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act, 1997, Pub. L. No. 104-208,
§ 4001, 110 Stat. 3009, 3009-500; and Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993,
Pub. L. No. 103-66, § 14003(c), 107 Stat. 312, 685.
76
The assignment of responsibility to the OMB of calculating deficits for the purpose of sequestration is a result of a Supreme Court decision. In Bowsher v. Synar, the
Court held unconstitutional the triggering of sequestrations by an official accountable
to Congress for separation-of-powers reasons. 478 U.S. 714, 726-27 (1986). Congress
can direct the OMB, in determining whether to order sequestration, to use certain estimates such as those produced by CBO or the Budget Committees, “as long as the estimates [are] embedded in the enacted legislation,” either explicitly or by reference.
Hearing Before the H. Comm. on the Budget, supra note 48, at 12 (statement of Peter R.
Orszag, Director, Congressional Budget Office); see also Hershey Foods Corp. v. USDA,
158 F. Supp. 2d 37, 41 (D.D.C. 2001) (holding that Congress can “incorporate by crossreference in its bills” without violating the Presentment Clause). That being said, the
President can still veto any legislation containing this effective waiver of PAYGO, as
with any other legislation passed by Congress.
73
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II. THE BUDGET PROCESS AND TEMPORARY LEGISLATION
A. Budget Rules
1. The Instability of Baseline Estimates
It is against this background of endogenous budget rules that we
must examine potential benefits of temporary legislation. Recently,
Professor George Yin has argued that Congress should favor temporary legislation—or at least such legislation that has only temporary
budgetary effects—because it enhances fiscal restraint at the federal
77
level. This restraint, he argues, is due to the legislative process’s
complete reckoning for the costs of temporary legislation, in contrast
78
to the incomplete accounting for lasting legislation. Yin notes that
extension of temporary legislation requires affirmative action by Congress; at such point of action, Congress must account for the full cost
79
of the temporary program within overall budget constraints. When
enacting lasting legislation, on the other hand, Congress typically only
has the estimated costs generated during the budget window, usually a
five- or ten-year period. Because the legislation need not be reconsidered for its effects to continue, Yin argues, Congress does not con80
sider costs outside of this period. For this reason, the theory goes,
the official cost of the legislation underestimates its full cost since leg81
islators will ignore any forgone revenues beyond the budget window.
To illustrate Yin’s argument, assume that Congress wishes to enact
a tax cut with an estimated cost of $2 billion per year for the next
twenty years. Party leaders, however, have also agreed upon a budget
constraint of $10 billion for the assumed budget-window period of ten
years. There are two legislative options, as shown in Table 1 below:
Option #1, a $2 billion-per-year tax cut that sunsets after Year 5, or
Option #2, a lasting tax cut half the size of the one originally contemplated. Ignoring time-value-of-money issues, each produces an official-cost estimate of $10 billion over the budget window period of ten
years. From the vantage point of a twenty-year horizon, however, the
full cost of the lasting tax cut is $20 billion whereas the full cost of the
77

See Yin, supra note 10, at 181 (“This Article challenges the positions of [sunset]
critics and explains why fiscal restraint may be enhanced with greater use of temporaryeffect legislation, such as legislation with sunsets, and less use of permanent legislation.”).
78
Id. at 192-94.
79
Id. at 193.
80
Id.
81
Id.
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temporary legislation remains consistent with the official cost of only
$10 billion. This means that the official-cost estimate for the permanent legislation fails to take into account $10 billion of costs.

Table 1: Illustration of Yin’s Thesis: Comparison of Official Cost,
Full Cost, and Unaccounted-for Cost of Temporary and
82
Lasting Tax-Cut Legislation

Years
1-5

Years
6-10

Years
11-15

Years
16-20

Years
1-20

Years
1-10

Years
11-20

Years
1-20

Unaccountedfor Cost
(Full –
Official Cost)

10

0

0

0

10

10

N/A

10

0

N/A

10

0

0

10

10

N/A

10

0

Full Cost

Option #1
Year 1:
Tax Cut
with FiveYear
Sunset
Year 6:
Five-Year
Extension
of Sunset

Official Cost

TOTAL
Option #2
Year 1:
Lasting
Tax Cut
(half as
large)
TOTAL

0

5

5

5

5

20

10

N/A

10

10

10

In this example, if the legislature pursues Option #1, it can renew
the five-year sunset at the end of Year 5. The temporary legislation
would again produce equality between the official-cost and full-cost
estimates of $10 billion over the next ten years. Alternatively, if the
legislature had initially passed a lasting tax cut, it would not need to
extend the legislation in Year 6. Both options fit within the budget
constraint of $10 billion for the years in which legislation is passed.
Option #1, however, produces full costs of $20 billion and no unaccounted-for costs, whereas Option #2 produces full costs of $20 billion
and unaccounted-for costs of $10 billion.
82

This example is loosely derived from a hypothetical scenario in Yin’s article,
which aims to illustrate why temporary-effect legislation enhances fiscal restraint. See
Yin, supra note 10, at 237-39, 237 tbl.4.
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Yin’s thesis—that temporary legislation produces accurate officialcost estimates and lasting legislation does not—suffers from a reliance
83
upon the stability of the baseline estimate. The official cost of legislation is the difference between the amount of government revenues that
occurs with the enactment of the legislation and the baseline (or the
amount that would occur in the legislation’s absence). For Yin’s thesis
to hold, the baseline estimates must assume that “permanent laws will
84
continue forever but that temporary laws will expire as scheduled.”
The history of temporary legislation, however, demonstrates why
this assumption is unwarranted. Not only are baseline estimates endogenous and therefore subject to manipulation by Congress, but the political pressures for spending and tax cuts are great. We can therefore
85
expect—and have indeed already witnessed —intentional alteration of
the baseline to lower the perceived costs of temporary legislation.
Typically, the baseline accepts current law as fixed; because the
baseline assumes temporary provisions expire as scheduled, revenues
are projected to increase at the sunset date (in the case of sunsetting
tax cuts). Accordingly, making permanent or extending the temporary
provisions of EGTRRA and JGTRRA would eliminate or delay the increase in revenues, and instead such legislation would be scored as a
86
revenue loss. Confronted with the costs of renewing the temporary
provisions of EGTRRA and JGTRRA, President George W. Bush proposed in his 2006–2009 Presidential Budgets that the baseline would no
87
longer assume that current law would expire according to its terms.
He proposed that the baseline should instead assume that such tax cuts
were permanent, despite their adoption as “temporary.” When compared against this baseline, a permanent extension of the tax cuts
would be scored with zero costs because the shifted baseline already assumed that the temporary cut would become permanent. Moreover, a
83

For a critique of baseline estimates, see Timothy J. Muris, The Uses and Abuses of
Budget Baselines, in THE BUDGET PUZZLE: UNDERSTANDING FEDERAL SPENDING 41
( John F. Cogan et al. eds., 1994).
84
Yin, supra note 10, at 186.
85
This point will be illustrated in the following discussion.
86
See Cheryl D. Block, Budget Gimmicks (describing the maneuver), in FISCAL
CHALLENGES, supra note 8, at 39, 58.
87
See OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, ANALYTICAL
PERSPECTIVES: BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, FISCAL YEAR 2009, at
222 (2008) [hereinafter OMB, ANALYTICAL PERSPECTIVES 2009], available at http://
www.gpoaccess.gov/usbudget/fy09/pdf/spec.pdf; OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC.
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, MAJOR SAVINGS AND REFORMS IN THE PRESIDENT’S 2008
BUDGET 203 (2007), available at http://www.gpoaccess.gov/usbudget/fy08/pdf/
savings.pdf; Block, supra note 86, at 58.
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temporary extension of the cut would result in an apparent increase in
revenues because the failure to permanently extend the tax cut would
88
now be scored as a revenue gain over the assumed baseline.
Then–CBO Director, Peter Orszag, criticized this perhaps shocking manipulation of the baseline by arguing that “scoring expiring
provisions as entailing no budgetary cost after their expiration, but
then assuming their extension in the baseline, would cause the costs
of extending those provisions to ‘disappear’ from the process—which
89
would substantially undermine its integrity.” Despite such criticisms,
two years later, Orszag, as OMB Director for President Barack Obama,
incorporated several of the EGTRRA and JGTRRA tax cuts permanently into the baseline in the President’s 2010 and 2011 Budgets,
90
with expiring provisions enacted subsequent to Obama taking office.
Although the Obama Administration justifies such baseline treatment
88

See OMB, ANALYTICAL PERSPECTIVES 2009, supra note 87, at 222 (recognizing
that not extending EGTRRA and JGTRRA in the baseline “raises inappropriate procedural road blocks to extending them at current rates”).
89
Hearing Before the H. Comm. on the Budget, supra note 48, at 10 (statement of Peter
R. Orszag, Director, Congressional Budget Office). Some have argued that this alteration to current baseline practices is justified because current baseline calculations favor
spending over tax cuts. See, e.g., JAMES HORNEY & RICHARD KOGAN, CTR. ON BUDGET
AND POLICY PRIORITIES, KEY ARGUMENT AGAINST APPLYING PAY-AS-YOU-GO TO TAX
CUTS DOES NOT WITHSTAND SCRUTINY 1 (2007), available at http://www.cbpp.org/
files/3-22-07bud.pdf (quoting former OMB Director Rob Portman as stating that
“there is a bias [in the baseline rules], in my view, for spending and a bias against tax
relief. Why? Because we assume that programs go out indefinitely on the spending
side. . . . Whereas on the tax side, we assume the tax relief would not continue.” (alterations in original)). Generally, entitlement provisions and tax provisions are treated
the same for purposes of calculating the baseline. There is a special rule that provides
for continuity in the baseline of temporary programs with annual outlays of more than
$50 million that were enacted prior to 1997. Id. at 1, 5. This advantage for spending
increases is generally offset, however, by the fact that the CBO scores new entitlement
programs, even if temporary, as if they were permanent (that is, for every year of the
budget window, including those past the program’s sunset date). Id. at 5-6.
90
See DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, GENERAL EXPLANATIONS OF THE ADMINISTRATION’S
FISCAL YEAR 2010 REVENUE PROPOSALS app. (2009), available at http://
www.treasury.gov/resource-center/tax-policy/Documents/grnbk09.pdf (“Most of the
tax reductions enacted in 2001 and 2003 expire on December 31, 2010. The Administration’s baseline projection of current policy continues all of these expiring provisions
except for repeal of estate and generation-skipping transfer taxes.”); OFFICE OF MGMT.
& BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, ANALYTICAL PERSPECTIVES: BUDGET OF
THE U.S. GOVERNMENT, FISCAL YEAR 2011, at 170 n.5 (2010) [hereinafter OMB, ANAavailable at http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/
LYTICAL PERSPECTIVES 2011],
budget/Analytical_Perspectives (“[T]he Budget, in the current policy baseline, assumes continuation of the 2001 and 2003 tax cuts as amended through June
2009 . . . . Among other changes, this continues two amendments made to these tax
cuts . . . [which] expand child tax credit refundability and the earned income tax credit for married couples.”).
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because it follows current policy, as opposed to current law, it even assumes tax cuts that it does not support within the baseline. Thus,
when the administration fails to support the Bush tax cuts for high91
end taxpayers, it scores this policy stance as a revenue increase.
Importantly, the Congressional Concurrent Budget Resolution for
Fiscal Year 2010 follows this practice of current policy baselines by also
granting authority to the Chairman of the House Budget Committee to
exclude the billions of dollars of budgetary effects ensuing from the extension of the EGTRRA, JGTRRA, and alternative-minimum-tax relief
92
provisions.
This effectively adjusts the baseline for all purposes of
House business to assume current policy continues rather than expires.
Finally, under current statutory PAYGO rules and proposals, discussed
below in subsection II.A.2, the baseline assumes temporary tax legislation to be permanent. Because these proposed changes to the calculation of the baseline do not apply to new temporary tax cuts, the permanence of any such future tax cuts would not be assumed within the
baseline. This would start anew the process whereby the baseline is
shifted in order to fail to account for the costs of permanent extension.
To continue with the above hypothetical and to illustrate the effects of a baseline shift, let us again assume that Congress wishes to
enact a tax cut costing $2 billion per year for twenty years, but is constrained by a cap of $10 billion in tax cuts during the budget window.
How would Yin’s thesis, which ignores sunsets in the baseline, fare
under Bush’s or Obama’s budget? As illustrated in Table 2 below,
temporary legislation would no longer have a budgetary advantage
over lasting legislation; the unaccounted-for cost in both scenarios
would be $10 billion because the official costs of the temporary legislation for Years 6–15 would be reduced to zero due to the alteration of
the baseline. In essence, Congress would not confront the full costs of
renewing temporary legislation because the official costs would be
measured through an accounting fiction in which the temporary legislation had somehow already been renewed, thereby leading to the incorporation of renewal costs within the budget baseline even at the time
that the renewal decision is on the table. That is, the costs of deciding to

91

See OMB, ANALYTICAL PERSPECTIVES 2011, supra note 90, at 187-88 tbl.14-3 (forecasting that failing to extend the 20% rate for upper-income taxpayers will have a
positive effect on revenues). The Administration does not contend that this revenue
increase can be used to pay for tax cuts under PAYGO rules, but instead that it “must
be devoted to deficit reduction.” Id. at 182 n.7.
92
S. Con. Res. 13, 111th Cong. § 421 (2009).
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renew would appear to be zero because the basis on which costs are es93
timated would assume that the renewal had already occurred.
Table 2: Comparison of Official Cost, Full Cost, and
Unaccounted-for Cost of Temporary and Lasting
Tax-Cut Legislation with Baseline Assuming
Permanence of Temporary Legislation

Years
1-5

Years
6-10

Years
11-15

Years
16-20

Years
1-20

Years
1-10

Years
11-20

Years
1-20

Unaccountedfor Cost
(Full –
Official Cost)

10

0

0

0

10

10

N/A

10

0

N/A

10

0

0

10

0

N/A

0

10

Full Cost

Option #1
Year 1:
Tax Cut
with FiveYear
Sunset
Year 6:
Five-Year
Extension
of Sunset
with
Baseline
Change

Official Cost

TOTAL
Option #2
Year 1:
Lasting
Tax Cut
(half as
large)
TOTAL

10

5

5

5

5

20

10

N/A

10

10

10

Although the CBO has yet to alter the baseline in this manner,
history suggests this possibility is far from remote. Indeed, we have
previously seen examples of Congress—driven by political pressures—
directing the scoring practices of the CBO in an aggressive manner by,
for example, demanding that the CBO set the PAYGO balance to zero
93

One could argue that in Option #2, Congress might approve another tax cut in
Year 6, given its willingness to approve a temporary tax cut in that time frame under
Option #1. In such a case, the initial “advantage” of temporary legislation has not been
eliminated. Because of the endowment effect, however, it will be much easier politically
to argue for extension of expiring tax cuts than to enact new tax cuts in Year 6. See infra
note 95 and accompanying text. Additionally, if Congress enacts an additional tax cut
as temporary under Option #2 in Year 6, the above discussion still applies such that any
baseline shift will reduce the budgetary advantage for that piece of legislation.
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94

in order to avoid sequestration under PAYGO. Such pressures are
not simply of historical interest: it is possible that the public will view
an expiration of the EGTRRA and JGTRRA tax cuts as the largest tax
95
increase in history, thereby providing Congress with strong political
incentives to reduce the perceived cost of making such cuts permanent. Indeed, these same pressures have caused the OMB under Presidents Bush and Obama to calculate its baseline in an unprecedented
manner. Furthermore, the statutory rules that governed the manner
in which the CBO calculated baseline estimates have expired, thereby
96
giving the CBO more flexibility in constructing its baseline.
To reiterate, the problems identified above arise in the tax legislative process due to the endogeneity of the rules governing the proposal
and adoption of legislation. Put differently, the foxes are guarding the
henhouse. And because Congress can alter the budget rules without
interference from the other branches, it is likely that budget pressures,
coupled with a popular preference for tax cuts, will someday cause the
CBO to assume permanence of temporary tax cuts in its baseline projection, thereby creating the convenient fiction that subsequent renewal of tax cuts is costless.
In fact, such pressures have already induced the House Budget
Committee to effectively do this for purposes of House PAYGO rules,
as discussed below in subsection II.A.2. This development not only
signals a trend in altering budget rules to accommodate the reenactment of temporary tax cuts but also drastically reduces the significance
of the CBO’s baseline on congressional decisions regarding such reenactment. Currently, PAYGO rules function as the primary budgetary
mechanism through which lawmakers are forced to consider a proposal’s costs as measured against the baseline. Moreover, in addition to
estimates from the CBO, executive-branch estimates of the costs of legislation, particularly if they are formalized in the OMB, may affect how
legislators and their constituents view the costs of proposed legisla94

See supra notes 73-76 and accompanying text (discussing examples of zeroing
out PAYGO balances).
95
See Kysar, supra note 8, at 391 (discussing the view that taxpayers may process
the expiration of the tax cuts as a tax increase due to the “endowment effect”—the
phenomenon that people place greater value on that which they have rather than on
that which they do not have).
96
The CBO currently chooses to create its baseline calculations by following the
now-expired provisions of the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act
of 1985 and the Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974.
CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, THE BUDGET AND ECONOMIC OUTLOOK: FISCAL YEARS 2010
TO 2020, at 99 (2010), available at http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/108xx/doc10871/0126-Outlook.pdf.
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tion. For instance, under the George H. W. Bush Administration, the
OMB estimated that a reduction in capital-gains tax rates would in97
crease revenues due to the churning of long-term assets. The CBO,
however, estimated a reduction in revenues from such a policy change,
98
initially causing the legislation to fail PAYGO requirements. Nonetheless, the dispute between estimates raged for years until Congress
99
eventually reduced capital-gains rates. Similarly, one can think of the
change in baseline estimates advanced by the past two administrations
as at least partially incorporated into the official-cost estimate of legislation. Because this change significantly reduces the official cost of renewing temporary legislation, it seriously challenges the conclusion
that temporary legislation leads to fiscal prudence more readily than
does lasting legislation.
2. PAYGO Forgone
100

As discussed above, each house currently has an internal PAYGO
101
rule, and Congress has recently enacted a statutory PAYGO rule that
102
the executive branch can enforce with mandatory sequestration.
Current trends indicate that Congress will continue to exempt many
expiring tax provisions from PAYGO’s reach, further showing that the
endogeneity of these rules undermines any fiscal prudence instilled by
sunset provisions.
The PAYGO rules of the House and Senate forbid consideration
of direct-spending legislation and, in the case of the Senate, revenue
legislation that results in deficit increases or surplus reductions, as
103
measured over both a six-year period and an eleven-year period.
Like other legislative rules, the strength of the PAYGO rules is tenuous. House rules are especially weak because they are not self97

ALLEN SCHICK, THE FEDERAL BUDGET: POLITICS, POLICIES, PROCESS 170 (3d
ed. 2007).
98
Id.
99
Id.
100
See supra notes 71-76 and accompanying text (discussing the statutory PAYGO
rules of the 1990s and 2000s, and noting Congress’s successful efforts to avoid sequestration while the PAYGO rules were in effect).
101
See supra note 39 for a discussion of the PAYGO rules for each house.
102
See Statutory Pay-As-You-Go Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-139, § 5(b), 124 Stat. 8,
15 (“If the annual report . . . shows a debit on either PAYGO scorecard for the budget
year, OMB shall prepare and the President shall issue and include in that report a sequestration order that, upon issuance, shall reduce budgetary resources of direct
spending programs by enough to offset that debit . . . .”).
103
H.R. Res. 5, 112th Cong. § 2(d) (2011); S. Con. Res. 21, 110th Cong. § 201 (2007).
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enforcing—that is, they require a representative to raise affirmatively a
104
point of order—and because the House commonly waives its rules.
Waiver standards in the Senate are stricter, requiring a three-fifths
vote after a point of order has been raised, although recently the Senate has supported waiver of its PAYGO rules for temporary tax legis105
The rules rely on the Budget Committee’s budgetary estilation.
106
mates, as measured against the CBO baseline estimates.
As
discussed above, however, the Congressional Concurrent Budget Resolution for Fiscal Year 2010 provided that the Chairman of the House
Budget Committee could ignore the majority of the sunsetting tax
107
Accorcuts for purposes of providing estimates for House rules.
dingly, PAYGO did not apply to, and offsets were not required for,
these temporary provisions.
Current statutory PAYGO rules enacted at the beginning of 2010
also exclude many expiring tax cuts. They incorporate within the
baseline trillions of dollars of spending and revenue reductions, including making permanent many of the EGTRRA and JGTRRA tax
cuts, as well as the costs of extending alternative-minimum-tax relief
108
and permanently reenacting the estate-tax exemption at 2009 levels.
Arguably, Congress could just as easily exempt lasting tax cuts from
PAYGO rules. The mechanics of a sunset provision, however, make it
more likely as a political matter to obtain an exemption from PAYGO
for temporary legislation. First, due to the endowment effect—the
cognitive phenomenon by which people place greater value on that

104

For instance, the House Rules Committee, with approval from a simple majority of the House, often adopts special ad hoc rules for consideration of certain legislation (particularly budgetary legislation), which waive any points of order, including
those under the PAYGO rule. An affirmative vote of two-thirds by the representatives
may also suspend all House rules, allowing no points of order. Rules of the House of
Representatives, Rule XV, H.R. Doc. No. 110-162, at 662-81 (2009).
105
See Bob Cusack & Mike Soraghan, House Leaders Reject Senate’s AMT Fix, THE
HILL (Dec. 7, 2007, 11:42 AM), http://thehill.com/homenews/news/13830-houseleaders-reject-senates-amt-fix (“Senate Democratic leaders, fearful of a public backlash
if they didn’t pass the AMT fix, reluctantly agreed Thursday to waive pay-as-you-go
rules and passed their measure 88–5.”).
106
Id.; see also S. Con. Res. 21, 110th Cong. § 201(a)(5)(A) (2007) (requiring that
estimates “use the baseline surplus or deficit used for the most recently adopted concurrent resolution on the budget”).
107
See S. Con. Res. 13, 111th Cong. § 421(a) (2009) (permitting the Chairman to
“exclude from his evaluation the budgetary effects of [legislative] provisions if such
effects would have been reflected in a baseline adjusted for current policy”).
108
See H.R.J. Res. 45, 111th Cong. § 7 (2010) (providing for adjustments of estimates
of budgetary effects of PAYGO legislation for current policy in four areas of the budget).
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which they have than on an identical item which they do not have —
the public may feel entitled to the benefits that current tax law bestows,
110
creating too much political pressure to refuse reenactment. Indeed,
I have previously argued that, in 2002, Congress let lapse the prior statutory PAYGO rules so that permanent extension of the EGTRRA tax
111
Second, it may appear more legitimate to excut would be easier.
empt current law, rather than future law, from new legislative rules
simply to preserve the “status quo.”
To conclude, sunset provisions escape characterization as tools
of fiscal responsibility through shifting baselines and exceptions to
112
the revenue-offset or PAYGO rules.
These phenomena disaffirm
the purported fiscal prudence of temporary legislation.
B. Effects of Temporary Legislation Beyond the Budget Window
A second fundamental problem with the defense of sunsetting is
that temporary legislation often will have economic effects beyond the
budget window, notwithstanding a sunset date. To be sure, Yin condones only temporary legislation “whose budget effect does not extend
113
past the budget window period,” or “temporary-effect legislation.”
This Article contends, however, that temporary-effect legislation may
be rarer than expected.
One example of this phenomenon in the tax context is the tem114
porary § 965 dividend.
This dividend allowed U.S. corporations a
one-time opportunity to receive a deduction for eighty-five percent of
“repatriated” dividends received from their foreign subsidiaries
109

See Jon D. Hanson & Douglas A. Kysar, Taking Behavioralism Seriously: The Problem of Market Manipulation, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 630, 674 (1999) (describing an endowment effect as when “an individual comes to possess an item, [and then] instantaneously (or nearly so) values that item more than she did prior to possessing it”).
110
See supra note 95 and accompanying text (explaining that because of the endowment effect, the public may view an expiration of the EGTRRA and JGTRRA tax
cuts as representing a particularly large tax increase, thereby motivating Congress to
lower the perceived cost of maintaining them permanently).
111
See Kysar, supra note 8, at 384 (arguing that the sunset provisions contributed to
the executive branch’s refusal to support the continuation of the PAYGO rules that
applied to tax cuts).
112
The manipulation of other budget rules is less politically costly than repealing outright the PAYGO rules because the latter are more transparent and known to
the public.
113
Yin, supra note 10, at 178. Yin also explains that permanent legislation, the
long-term costs of which budgetary estimates do not account for, stands in contrast to
temporary-effect legislation, the budgetary effect of which is confined to the budget
window. Id.
114
I.R.C. § 965 (2006).
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against the normal income tax imposed on such dividends, so long as
115
the dividends were invested domestically.
Although § 965 did not
technically have a sunset date, its effect was limited in duration; the
deduction was available for the first tax year beginning after October
22, 2004, or, alternatively at the taxpayer’s election, for the taxpayer’s
116
last tax year beginning prior to that date.
For the first prospective tax year of § 965’s effects, the JCT estimated that § 965 would increase revenues by $2.8 billion, as measured
117
against the baseline.
Although temporary in design, the JCT estimated that the provision would produce long-term revenue losses for
every year thereafter in the ten-year budget window, totaling $3.3 bil118
The pattern of revenue losses makes it likely that the JCT
lion.
would have estimated losses as continuing beyond the budget window
119
if so required.
The JCT arrived at its projection by using dynamic estimates,
which account for changes in taxpayer behavior after enactment of
120
the proposed legislation.
The up-front revenue gains were due to
taxpayers repatriating their foreign earnings when, without the provi121
These gains were offset
sion, they had no intention of so doing.
somewhat by losses from those taxpayers who would have repatriated
their earnings regardless of the enactment of § 965, although at a
122
higher tax rate. The future losses of revenues were those that would
have been received from this latter group of taxpayers over the rest of
123
the budget-window period. Additionally, such losses were amplified
115

Id. § 965(a)(1).
Id. § 965(f).
117
Edward D. Kleinbard & Patrick Driessen, A Revenue Estimate Case Study: The Repatriation Holiday Revisited, 120 TAX NOTES 1191, 1191 (2008).
118
Id. at 1191.
119
See id. at 1197 (explaining the JCT’s process for determining and updating its
estimate); Yin, supra note 10, at 178 n.9 (describing the § 965 dividend as an example of temporary legislation that may not be temporary-effect legislation because it
still could have long-term budget effects that continue throughout a ten-year budget
window).
120
See Kleinbard & Driessen, supra note 117, at 1193 (stating that JCT revenue estimates are dynamic because they incorporate taxpayer reactions to change).
121
See id. at 1199 (“The JCT staff referred internally to this . . . as ‘induced’ dividends, because section 965 induced taxpayers to pay the dividends when those taxpayers otherwise would have been expected . . . to keep the funds permanently reinvested
offshore.”).
122
Id. at 1199-200.
123
Id. Note also that JCT staff is forbidden from accounting for the time-value-ofmoney benefits from receiving revenues earlier rather than later (and vice versa). Id.
at 1200-01.
116
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by the JCT’s conclusion that taxpayers would expect future temporary
124
“tax holidays,” similar to § 965, and would keep earnings offshore
indefinitely. In this way, the JCT spread out $1 billion of additional
costs over the budget-window period to reflect the inability of the
125
United States to tax such earnings in the meantime. Later, the head
of the JCT described this estimate of future taxpayer behavior as “very
126
conservative.” The § 965 example underscores that there are many
cases in which temporary legislation will face the same critique as lasting legislation—namely, that the budget process does not account for
costs that occur beyond the budget window.
Table 3 illustrates this principle. Using our previous example, assume that Congress wishes to enact a tax cut costing $2 billion per
year for twenty years but is constrained by an overall cap of $10 billion
in tax cuts during the budget window of ten years. Assume further
that dynamic scoring of the five-year temporary version of this tax cut
produces $10 billion in costs inside the budget window, but $5 billion
in costs outside the budget window due to changes in taxpayer behavior arising from the tax cut. This is also the case upon a five-year extension of the sunset. In this instance, the unaccounted-for cost of the
temporary legislation equals that of lasting legislation. Of course,
these unaccounted-for costs need not rise to the levels produced by
the lasting legislation, as in this example, but they need not be lower
either. A generalized comparison is unattainable without specific
knowledge of the future costs at issue.

124
125
126

Id. at 1200.
Id.
Id.

KYSAR REVISED FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

1038

3/14/2011 12:30 PM

University of Pennsylvania Law Review

[Vol. 159: 1007

Table 3: Comparison of Official Cost, Full Cost and Unaccounted-for
Cost of Temporary and Lasting Tax-Cut Legislation Where
Temporary Legislation Produces Costs
Beyond Budget Window

Years
1-5

Years
6-10

Years
11-15

Years
16-20

Years
1-20

Years
1-10

Years
11-20

Years
1-20

Unaccountedfor Cost
(Full –
Official Cost)

10

0

5

0

15

10

N/A

10

5

N/A

10

0

5

15

10

N/A

10

5

Full Cost

Option #1
Year 1:
Tax Cut
with FiveYear
Sunset
Year 6:
Five-Year
Extension
of Sunset

Official Cost

TOTAL
Option #2
Year 1:
Lasting
Tax Cut
(half as
large)
TOTAL

10

5

5

5

5

20

10

N/A

10

10

10

The example of § 965 is not an outlier. Indeed, the JCT estimates
that many expiring provisions have costs well outside their expiration
date and throughout the budget window. For instance, in the last JCT
report analyzing legislation addressing the extenders, the JCT scored
approximately thirty-five percent of the extenders as having budget effects throughout the ten-year budget window despite having sunset
127
provisions primarily of one or two years in length. Other JCT reports
127

STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 110TH CONG., ESTIMATED BUDGET
EFFECTS OF THE “TAX EXTENDERS AND ALTERNATIVE MINIMUM TAX RELIEF ACT OF
2008” SCHEDULED FOR CONSIDERATION ON THE SENATE FLOOR ON SEPTEMBER 23, 2008
(Comm. Print 2008), available at http://www.jct.gov/x-69-08r.pdf. Such provisions include: (1) tax-free distributions from IRAs to certain public charities, (2) R&D tax
credit, (3) fifteen-year straight-line cost recovery for certain retail investments, (4) basis
adjustment to S-corporations making charitable contributions of property, (5) credit
for mine-rescue-team training, (6) credit for holders of qualified zone academy bonds,
(7) accelerated depreciation for business property on Indian reservations, (8) increased rehabilitation credit, (9) tax incentives for investment in the District of Columbia, (10) abatement of incentive–stock option alternative minimum tax (AMT) liability, (11) recovery-period adjustment for farming business machinery and
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128

affirm the prevalence of this trend. Although the JCT did not project
outside of the budget window, it is likely that the costs do not simply
disappear at the end of the budget window given that they generally
continue eight to nine years after the sunset date. A more robust and
dynamic analysis of taxpayer behavior may produce even higher rates of
129
temporary legislation with effects beyond the budget window.
In sum, temporary legislation in many instances inflicts costs outside the budget window, which will not always outweigh the unaccounted-for costs of lasting legislation. When they do, however, the
enactment of lasting legislation is preferred from the standpoint of
accurate cost estimation.
C. Estimating Full Costs
As the prior analysis illustrates, opportunities for manipulation
created by the endogeneity of budget rules call into question the superiority of temporary legislation over lasting legislation in producing
official-cost estimates that match full costs. Such endogeneity mutes the
ability of the rules to emit signals that effectively constrain pressures to
spend. Congress can change or waive the rules to pursue current policy, ignoring official-cost estimates, and there is little, if any, external enforcement of them. For this reason, a leading economist has concluded

equipment, (12) tax treatment of mental health and substance use disorder benefits;
(13) special allocation of private-activity-bond financing, (14) low-income housing credit allocation, (15) increase in rehabilitation credit, (16) credit to holders of Midwestern tax-credit bonds, (17) penalty-free withdrawals from retirement plans for qualified
disaster-recovery-assistance distributions, (18) tax-exempt bond financing and lowincome housing tax relief for Hurricane Ike areas, (19) expensing of qualified disaster
expenses, and (20) relaxation of mortgage-revenue-bond limitations for presidentially
declared disasters.
128
A recent JCT report exploring various policy options in energy taxation identified at least four tax credits with a one- or two-year sunset provision that had budget effects for the entirety of a five-year budget window. STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM.
ON TAXATION, 111TH CONG., TAX EXPENDITURES FOR ENERGY PRODUCTION AND
CONSERVATION 110 tbl.9 (Comm. Print 2009), available at http://www.jct.gov/
publications.html?func=startdown&id=3554. These provisions are the following: (1)
manufacturer credit for energy-efficient homes; (2) hybrid-vehicle tax credit; (3) alternative-fuel-vehicle credit; and (4) refined-coal credit.
129
One should note that, to the extent temporary legislation produces costs that
the relevant budget scorekeeper estimates as occurring beyond the budget window,
some of their purposes fade. For instance, such legislation would trigger the Byrd
Rule. See supra notes 51-55 and accompanying text. It is not always the case, however,
that the official cost will account for costs beyond the budget window.

KYSAR REVISED FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

1040

University of Pennsylvania Law Review

3/14/2011 12:30 PM

[Vol. 159: 1007

that although the U.S. budget rules may have produced “some success
130
at deficit control,” such conclusions are “highly tentative.”
On the other hand, if Congress does have incentives to consider
the costs of legislation, then worthy of critical examination is the assumption that, in enacting lasting legislation, Congress will necessarily
ignore costs outside the budget window. Indeed, Congress may take into consideration the full cost of lasting legislation, as well as the official131
First, interest groups—at least when competing for
cost estimates.
scarce governmental resources—may have incentives to highlight to
Congress the full costs of lasting legislation beyond the budget win132
dow, even when budget scorekeepers do not.
Second, if the projected costs of lasting legislation are sufficiently
daunting, legislators (on pain of political retribution) may well take into account such costs even if, falling outside the budget window, they
133
are not officially scored.
Good-government reform groups often
analyze the CBO’s estimates, sometimes offering their own long-term
134
Constituent concerns and ideological views may also
projections.
drive legislators to protect the fiscal health of the country.
Historically, congressional members have analyzed an estimate of
the costs of legislation outside the budget window in a variety of con135
texts, including consideration of the Bush tax cuts. Indeed, the sun130

Alan J. Auerbach, Federal Budget Rules: The US Experience, 15 SWEDISH ECON.
POL’Y REV. 57, 81 (2008).
131
This is a possibility that Yin recognizes but underappreciates. See Yin, supra
note 10, at 204-05 (acknowledging the “shadow” role of continuing costs in permanent
legislation).
132
See Garrett, supra note 67, at 504-05 (arguing that budgetary offset requirements create competition among interest groups that ultimately results in the production of information, leading to enhanced legislative deliberation and accountability).
133
See SCHICK, supra note 97, at 32 (“Shifts in public opinion impact the budget by
weakening or strengthening fiscal discipline in the White House and Congress. . . . It is
highly probable that even in the absence of [budget] rules, big deficits would have deterred Congress and the president from establishing new entitlements and impelled
them to seek savings in old ones.”).
134
See, e.g., GUY “ROLAND” KING & DONALD N. MUSE, CRITIQUE OF CONGRESSIONAL
BUDGET OFFICE COST ESTIMATE FOR THE “SMALL BUSINESS HEALTH FAIRNESS ACT OF
2005” (H.R. 525), available at http://www.realtor.org/small_business_health_coverage.
nsf/docfiles/CritiqueofCBO.pdf/$FILE/CritiqueofCBO.pdf (finding fault with the
CBO’s estimates of the people who would benefit from an act concerning coverage of
certain health plans); Nicholas Loris, CBO Grossly Underestimates Costs of Cap and Trade,
THE FOUNDRY ( June 22, 2009, 4:25 PM) http://blog.heritage.org/2009/06/22/
cbo-grossly-underestimates-costs-of-cap-and-trade (listing analysis problems that led the
CBO to underestimate the costs of a climate-change bill).
135
See STAFF OF S. BUDGET COMM., 109TH CONG., COST OF BUSH TAX CUTS EXPLODES OUTSIDE FIVE-YEAR BUDGET WINDOW (Comm. Print 2005), available at
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set provisions of JGTRRA show that Congress’s concerns extend
beyond the formal budget process’s constraints. The JGTRRA tax
provisions were made temporary, in part, to reduce the costs of the
legislation as agreed upon by the legislators in light of a growing defi136
cit, rather than simply to comply with PAYGO or the Byrd Rule. For
these reasons, interest groups, constituents, and political ideology may
spur congressional members to heed the full costs of legislation and to
downplay misleading official costs—thus reconciling, to an extent, the
accounting differences between temporary and lasting legislation.
It is also possible, however, that given the pressures to spend and
reduce taxes, Congress pays attention only to those estimates that violate congressional norms. It is reasonable to conclude that, in addition to restrictions formally put into place in the official budget
process, informal processes such as those enumerated above may generate such norms. Both sets of norms, however, may not be of equal
strength or of much strength at all.
III. THE INFORMATION-PRODUCING AND FLEXIBILITY FUNCTIONS OF
TEMPORARY LEGISLATION
A. Deliberation and Temporary Legislation
In addition to the theory that sunset provisions enhance fiscal responsibility, pro-temporary legislation scholars also tout their information-producing functions, as well as the flexibility they offer to legislators when dealing with temporary or uncertain problems. Both theory
and experience with sunset provisions call into question these purported benefits.
Default rules can be seen to differentiate temporary legislation
from lasting legislation. The former terminates without further legislative action, while the latter indeterminably remains in effect. Some
http://budget.senate.gov/democratic/charts_taxcuts.html (using CBO data to illustrate the $1.8 trillion ten-year cost of the Bush tax cuts, including costs five years
outside the budget window); see also CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, ADDITIONAL INFORMATION ON THE ESTIMATED BUDGETARY AND ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF S. 2611 (2006),
available at http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/72xx/doc7208/s2611.pdf (estimating costs
outside the ten-year budget window in response to a request from senators considering the Comprehensive Immigration Reform Act of 2006); STAFF OF S. BUDGET
COMM., 109TH CONG., COST OF AMT REFORM EXPLODES OUTSIDE FIVE-YEAR BUDGET
WINDOW (Comm. Print 2005), available at http://budget.senate.gov/democratic/
charts_taxcuts.html (using CBO data to estimate costs of AMT reform beyond the
budget window).
136
See Kysar, supra note 8, at 378-82 (chronicling the debates over and passage of
JGTRRA and highlighting the Act’s sunset provision).
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scholars have argued that this difference saves the legislature transaction costs when it wishes to enact new policy; sunset provisions are ad137
vantageous when the initial policy is likely to be incorrect. The legislature, this argument runs, may use better information revealed dur138
during the interim period between enactment and sunset.
There
are, however, several problems with this account.
First, lasting legislation, of course, need not be permanent. Indeed, I have labeled legislation that does not expire by its own terms
as “lasting” rather than “permanent” to highlight this distinction.
Congress can repeal or amend lasting legislation that had been
enacted based upon poor information, thereby providing the flexibility benefits that advocates of temporary legislation tout. To provide a
recent example, Congress enacted legislation in 1993, as part of the
Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), codifying the Department of
Health and Human Services’s travel ban upon HIV-positive foreign
139
nationals. Subsequently, in 2008, Congress amended the INA to lift
the ban, reflecting a new scientific consensus about the lack of health
140
risks associated with such travel.
Additionally, if the initial policy is correct, then lasting legislation
will be the appropriate course of action. Otherwise, Congress will incur unnecessary transaction costs in an effort simply to maintain the
141
status quo by reenacting the legislation at sunset.
Accordingly, to

137

See, e.g., Gersen, supra note 10, at 271 (contending that temporary legislation
provides a more “pragmatic approach to new risk[s]” inherent in legislation); Fagan,
supra note 10, at 19 (arguing that, as opposed to permanent legislation, sunset provisions ”may reduce the cost” of an erroneous policy decision when new, better policy
options arise).
138
See Gersen, supra note 10, at 266-67; Fagan, supra note 10, at 19.
139
National Institutes of Health Revitalization Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-43,
§ 2007, 107 Stat. 122, 210 (1993); see also 139 CONG. REC. S1761-67 (daily ed. Feb. 18,
1993) (chronicling the debate on the merits of a ban on the immigration of HIVpositive foreign nationals).
140
See Tom Lantos and Henry J. Hyde United States Global Leadership Against
HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria Reauthorization Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110293, § 305, 122 Stat. 2918, 2963 (2008) (striking the language prohibiting immigration
of those with AIDS).
141
It could be argued, however, that temporary legislation actually functions as a
type of penalty default rule and thus enhances deliberation. See Ian Ayres & Robert
Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE
L.J. 87, 95-97 (1989) (recommending that a court can justifiably invalidate a contract—
as a type of penalty default rule—when the contracting parties strategically shift contract costs to the courts by leaving out key terms ex ante). By returning Congress to a
less desirable policy position, a sunset provision may prompt Congress to take action.
However, unlike the Ayres and Gertner proposal, which applies only when parties at-

KYSAR REVISED FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2011]

Lasting Legislation

3/14/2011 12:30 PM

1043

use sunset provisions optimally, the legislature must foresee whether
faulty information underlies the legislation or whether intervening
events will occur that would necessitate revised policy—perhaps an
142
unlikely scenario.
In many cases where sunset provisions are hypothesized to be useful—that is, when incorrect policy influences legislation—legislators
may ignore superior information that arises before or at the sunset
143
date and instead succumb to preformed policy preferences.
Such
willful ignorance of superior information may result from the failure
of deliberation to sway congressional members. This lack of success
144
As
may in turn be due, in part, to the influence of interest groups.
mentioned above, the experience with sunsets at the state level in the
1970s and early 1980s, as well as that of the tax extenders, suggests that
sunset provisions do not function as an effective means of policy review. Instead, interest groups continue to coalesce at each sunset date
145
This arrangement proves lucrain order to advance their interests.
tive to lobbyists and congressional members, who benefit from the re-

tempt to shift costs onto courts, a presumption in favor of temporary legislation would
be overly broad since it prompts Congress to act in all types of situations.
142
The ability to foresee conditions that will make a law obsolete is, of course, not
impossible. For instance, portions of the New Deal were temporary because legislators
were contending with problems perceived as temporary. See, e.g., Theodore Saloutos,
New Deal Agricultural Policy: An Evaluation, 61 J. AM. HIST. 394, 403 (1974) (noting the
temporary nature of the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933, which decreased crop
production to combat deflation because of the assumption that “the Depression was
going to end”). However, the difficulty in correctly identifying such situations is compounded by the challenge in defining the scope and length of the sunset provision. See
infra Sections III.B-C.
143
See Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond the Republican Revival, 97 YALE L.J. 1539, 1550
(1988) (“The antonym of deliberation is the imposition of outcomes by self-interested
and politically powerful private groups; republicans emphasize that deliberative
processes are often undermined by intimidation, strategic and manipulative behavior,
collective action problems, adaptive preferences, or—most generally—disparities in
political influence.”).
144
See id. (highlighting the role of interest groups, or “politically powerful private
groups,” in political outcomes). Economic critiques of interest-group influence highlight the disconnect between the preferences of constituents and the goals of enacted
legislation. This incongruence may be attributed to “strategic and manipulative behavior,” “cycling problems,” and the lack of a mechanism to gauge intensity of preferences, among other factors. Id. at 1545-46. But cf. Fagan, supra note 10, at 27 (arguing that more legislators will vote on a law “[i]f elections occur between a law’s
enactment and review,” thus “reducing the probability of legislative capture, decreas[ing] errors in objective facts upon which the law is based, and decreas[ing] errors of representing the subjective values of citizens”).
145
See infra Section IV.A (exploring this phenomenon in greater depth).
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146

peated provision of rents upon each sunset.
Although scholars are
correct to point out that, at times, temporary legislation receives in147
tense legislative attention, such attention may simply be the product
148
of lobbying efforts rather than deliberation over new information.
Some also suggest that, because of the necessity of legislative action upon the sunset date, temporary legislation produces repeated
interactions between interest groups and legislators, which in turn in149
centivize the former to provide better information to the latter. But
continuous relationships are a double-edged sword: frequent interaction may lead to a capture scenario in which the legislator is acting for
the interest group rather than a broader constituency, regardless of
150
When the consequences of legislative propresented information.
146

See infra Section IV.A (discussing incentives that public interest groups give to legislators in the form of campaign contributions, votes, or other benefits called “rents”).
147
See, e.g., Gersen, supra note 10, at 276-77 (noting that while many pieces of
temporary legislation command limited lawmaker attention, budget rules requiring
“setoffs for new spending programs” may lead to increased scrutiny of temporary legislation); see also Mary L. Heen, Reinventing Tax Expenditure Reform: Improving Program
Oversight Under the Government Performance and Results Act, 35 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 751,
798-801 (2000) (stating that the threat of sunset for employment tax credit produced
more information about its performance).
148
Whether the product of such lobbying efforts is to be embraced as representing
an equilibrium of political power or rejected as unsupported by reason and deliberation
invokes the classic debate between pluralists and republicans—a debate in which this
Article does not attempt to engage. Compare Daniel A. Farber & Philip P. Frickey, The
Jurisprudence of Public Choice, 65 TEX. L. REV. 873, 875-76 (1987) (characterizing pluralism as the political theory wherein “legislative outcomes simply reflect the equilibrium
of private political power”), with Sunstein, supra note 143, at 1544, 1547-49 (describing
republicanism as the view that laws should be developed through deliberation and be
supported by reason, not through blind acceptance of the products of politics).
149
See, e.g., Gersen, supra note 10, at 271-72 (citing political science models that
support the hypothesis that lobbyists are more honest in repeated, rather than isolated,
interactions with legislators).
150
See MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION 144 (2d prtg. 1971)
(noting that “the organized and active interest of small groups” can achieve legislative
results other than what would be expected under majority rule); David Martimort,
The Life Cycle of Regulatory Agencies: Dynamic Capture and Transaction Costs, 66 REV.
ECON. STUD. 929, 929 (1999) (arguing that regulatory capture arises from the repeated interactions between “political principals, interest groups, and regulatory
agencies”); see also MARVER H. BERNSTEIN, REGULATING BUSINESS BY INDEPENDENT
COMMISSION 155-60 (1955) (arguing that regulatory commissions tend to become
heavily influenced by those interest groups that they regulate); Samuel P. Huntington, The Marasmus of the ICC: The Commission, the Railroads, and the Public Interest, 61
YALE L.J. 467, 473-509 (1952) (discussing capture of the Interstate Commerce Commission by railroad-industry interests); George J. Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. SCI. 3 (1971) (discussing industry pursuit of regulation
to control market entry and to preserve market dominance). Some have argued that
capture theory is more potent in the legislative rather than regulatory context because
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posals affect certain interest groups acutely but members of the public
diffusely, the former will exert resources—and will be able to do so
quite effectively if they are well organized—to capture influence with
151
We can theorize,
lawmakers while the public remains inattentive.
then, that lawmakers are more attuned to the needs of interest groups
the more they interact with them, thereby increasing the risk that an
152
unreliable exchange of information occurs in the sunset scenario.
A final problematic feature of temporary legislation with respect to
information gathering is that it may produce over- and underresponsiveness, which spoils the information that the legislature considers
153
upon the sunset date. For instance, taxpayers may attempt to structure their transactions to capture tax benefits during the sunset period
of a tax cut. Fearful that the tax cut will not be extended, a large behavioral response to the temporary legislation may not necessarily indicate taxpayer reaction to a lasting tax cut; rather, taxpayer response is
154
simply compressed into a shorter time frame. To illustrate the converse, some have argued that a private party may underreact to temporary (as compared to permanent) environmental regulation if the
regulation requires costly alterations in behavior and is unlikely to be
155
extended. These examples illustrate that the sunset mechanism may

politicians do not guarantee independence or impartiality as agencies do. See, e.g.,
DAMIEN GERADIN & MICHEL KERF, CONTROLLING MARKET POWER IN TELECOMMUNICATIONS: ANTITRUST VS SECTOR-SPECIFIC REGULATION 113-14 (2003) (asserting that statutory provisions that constrain the political make-up and regulatory discretion of the
Federal Communications Commission make it less susceptible to “agency capture”).
151
See OLSON, supra note 150, at 141-48 (explaining attempts at regulatory capture
by special interest groups).
152
It is, of course, true that lawmakers are likely not focused only on rent extraction. Indeed, in contrast to earlier strains of public-choice theory, more recent scholarship accepts an expansive view of lawmakers’ preferences to include satisfaction of
their ideologies, as well as the accumulation of power and prestige, the presence of
which may contribute to meaningful deliberation. See, e.g., Daniel Shaviro, Beyond Public Choice and Public Interest: A Study of the Legislative Process as Illustrated by Tax Legislation
in the 1980s, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 66-68 (1990) (criticizing legal scholarship that adopts
a narrow view of public-choice theory for ignoring legislative motivations other than
extracting rent); see also Farber & Frickey, supra note 148, at 888-90 (arguing that public-choice theory improperly rejects legislative and voter concern for the public interest). Still, although the rent-extraction model may not present a complete picture of
the legislative process, it predicts the tendencies of the interactions between interest
groups and lawmakers.
153
See Gersen, supra note 10, at 278 (“[O]bserved level of behavioral adjustment
would be an inaccurate indicator of how private parties would respond to permanent
legislation.”).
154
Id.
155
See, e.g., id.
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not only fail to compel legislatures to consider new information but
may itself produce distorted data.
B. Setting the Scope of Temporary Legislation
In addition to their questionable effects, sunset provisions may
156
simply fail to target the right legislation. Judge Guido Calabresi, for
example, has criticized sunset provisions for their overbreadth, ar157
Interest
guing that they threaten expiration of still-beneficial laws.
groups who lobby for the scope and length of the sunset provision
most favorable to their agenda exacerbate this problem. Indeed, a
group of senators heavily criticized the proposed Sunset Act of 1977,
which would have subjected all federal programs to a five-year sunset,
because interest groups had lobbied successfully to delete tax expend158
itures from the sunset review.
Perhaps these concerns have inspired scholars to prescribe temporary legislation only in certain scenarios, such as those presenting
159
new or unfamiliar risks.
Because new risks are thought more likely
to inspire biased perception and overreaction, scholars advocate temporary legislation in uncertain environments to offset the effect of the
160
Specifically, their argument draws upon literature arguing
biases.
that individuals “often overestimate and overreact to newly recognized
161
risks.” This tendency is due to risk assessment based on whether in156

It may seem odd that we trust Congress to enact complex legal regimes but not
to set the appropriate length or scope of sunset provisions. Agencies, however, often implement statutes, making the difficult regulatory choices in such regimes in the face of
changing circumstances. In the sunset-provision context, however, agencies are unable
to exercise this advantage by changing the length of sunsets or by setting their scope.
157
See GUIDO CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES 61-62 (1982)
(arguing that sunset provisions merely shift the force of inertia to those who oppose
regulation, rather than to those in the previous majority who support it).
158
See S. REP. NO. 95-326, at 10, 51 (1977) (outlining senators’ disapproval of deletion, including their belief that the deletion will allow programs with large budgets to
avoid sunset review, and the senators’ intention to make a floor amendment to bring
tax expenditures back within sunset review).
159
See Gersen, supra note 10, at 268-71 (arguing that temporary legislation guards
against cognitive bias). Of course, interest groups will continue to exert influence in
lobbying for or against use of a sunset, even when their use is relegated to only “new
risk” legislation. They will, for example, have a role in setting forth what constitutes a
“new risk.”
160
See Fagan, supra note 10, at 25 (“If we assume that legislatures and constituents
sometimes irrationally perceive risk, and the basis of this perception is formed rationally
within a previous environment . . . then a sunset clause could provide a way out of this
temporal mismatch.”).
161
Gersen, supra note 10, at 269.
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formation regarding the risk is readily available, a phenomenon
162
known in the behavioralism literature as the “availability heuristic.”
For instance, if news coverage of a terrorist attack is imprinted in the
minds of citizens, they will, the theory goes, draw upon the availability
of published images and stories and overestimate the likelihood and
seriousness of future terrorist attacks. Citizens, under this view, will
then demand “too much” legislation or regulation based on their irra163
Some have suggested that making such legislational risk analysis.
tion or regulation temporary will compensate for the cognitive bias:
although congressional members may be forced politically to serve an
irrational public, at least the legislation or regulation will be reeva164
luated when cooler heads prevail.
Scholars have also cited “framing effects” and “escalating com165
mitment” as causes for the “stickiness” of regulatory programs. As to
the former, people have been shown to make inconsistent choices
based on the format of the option, or the way it is “framed”; they tend
to assign more value to losses than to equivalent forgone gains, a ten166
dency which is also referred to as loss aversion. Thus, interest-group
beneficiaries of an extant regulatory program will lobby harder than

162

See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, RISK AND REASON: SAFETY, LAW, AND THE ENVIRONMENT
33-35 (2002) (defining the “availability heuristic” as the phenomenon in which
“people tend to think that events are more probable if they can recall an incident of
their occurrence”); see also Cass R. Sunstein, What’s Available? Social Influences and Behavioral Economics, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 1295, 1297 (2003) (explaining that the availability
heuristic causes people to substitute deeper consideration of actual possibilities with
accessible, illustrative examples); Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Availability: A
Heuristic for Judging Frequency and Probability, 5 COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 207, 230 (1973) (observing that individuals perceive an event as being more likely to occur if a similar event
has recently occurred or if they have recently seen such an event in a film).
163
See, e.g., Risa Palm, Demand for Disaster Insurance: Residential Coverage (explaining
that many individuals, rather than using cost-benefit analyses to make purchase decisions for insurance, instead fall prey to biases that influence their estimates), in PAYING
THE PRICE: THE STATUS AND ROLE OF INSURANCE AGAINST NATURAL DISASTERS IN THE
UNITED STATES 51, 52-54 (Howard Kunreuther & Richard J. Roth eds., 1998).
164
See Gersen, supra note 10, at 271 (arguing that temporary legislation accounts
for political realities while simultaneously serving to prevent “long-term institutional
commitments”); Fagan, supra note 10, at 20-21 (recommending the use of sunset provisions in uncertain environments where error costs may be high).
165
See Jeffrey J. Rachlinski & Cynthia R. Farina, Cognitive Psychology and Optimal
Government Design, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 549, 603-06 (2002) (arguing that one benefit of
sunset provisions is that they permit periodic review of status quo situations to which
the public and legislators have grown attached).
166
See Hanson & Kysar, supra note 109, at 674 (describing loss aversion as when a
person’s aversion to losses is greater than her attraction to similarly sized gains).
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167

those who oppose reform. Moreover, “escalating commitment” will
lead initial advocates of a position to believe irrationally in its continued advantages; otherwise, they would be forced to defend their original decision, a cognitively costly demand. Therefore, the architects
and supporters of a regulatory regime may be unwilling to let it go,
even when presented with evidence of its looming failure or ineffec168
tiveness. Because sunsets may be structured to shift the status quo to
deregulation after a period of time, they are suggested as counter169
weights to these biases.
Despite the attractive logic behind these uses of sunset provisions,
one can contest the initial premise supporting them; cognitive biases do
not uniformly bring overreaction but may also lead to underreaction
170
and undersupply of regulation.
First, “biased assimilation” causes
people to accept wholeheartedly evidence that supports their initial be171
This
lief while repudiating or downplaying contradictory evidence.
bias has been used to predict a lack of regulation in certain areas. For
example, to the extent that there is mixed evidence of global climate
change and its predicted effects, such discrepancy may further polarize
172
the public’s views on the topic. Because skeptics will remain skeptical, it is unlikely that regulation on carbon emissions will occur; “the
173
conflicting scientific evidence will likely stifle any response.”
Additionally, a recent study concludes that individuals’ basic values, including those associated with climate change, gun rights, public
health, and national security, exert more influence over their risk per-

167

See Rachlinski & Farina, supra note 165, at 604-05 (noting that framing effects
mean that “those who might lose the benefits of an existing program will fight harder
than those who stand to benefit from its reform”).
168
See id. at 605 (explaining that people are wary of acknowledging that their initial position was erroneous).
169
See id. (noting that, although sunsets may be “too drastic a solution for many
regulatory contexts,” they can help address individuals’ psychological attachment to
the status quo).
170
See Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Accommodating Emergencies, 56 STAN. L.
REV. 605, 634-35 (2003) (describing how cognitive error caused by the availability heuristic could, in the case of a terrorist attack, lead people to fear infringements on civil
liberties from increased reglations and thus underregulate).
171
Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, The Psychology of Global Climate Change, 2000 U. ILL. L. REV.
299, 304-05.
172
See id. at 305-06 (using the example of global warming to demonstrate how
doubters assign greater weight to studies confirming their own beliefs while believers
similarly place greater weight on studies sympathetic to their views).
173
Id. at 306-07.
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174

ceptions than any other factor.
For instance, “cultural worldviews
accurately predict who is [a] global warming skeptic and who [is] a
true believer: hierarchs and individualists tend to dismiss the claim
that global warming is occurring and is [a] serious threat to our socie175
ty, whereas egalitarians and communitarians take the opposite view.”
Hierarchs and individualists may simply perceive risk information
through their cultural lens, leading them to support any deregulatory
176
efforts. In this manner, cultural polarization over new risks is likely.
Second, even if there is no divergence in evidence, loss aversion
177
may mean that some will oppose regulation.
Because they are attached to the status quo, “[p]eople are willing to tolerate risks that
they already bear, even though they would not otherwise be willing to
178
incur the same risks.” Given that many environmental, health, and
safety hazards only become known after a product or activity is already
well established within society, individuals may perceive the “new risk”
to be the regulatory prospect of banning or taxing the product or activity, rather than the hazard created by the product or activity itself. The
decades-long battles by lawmakers to regulate pervasive and harmful
substances, such as lead, asbestos, and cigarettes, seem to support this
view. Additionally, because people are averse to incurring assured
losses, in many instances, this phenomenon will also lead to reduced
179
demand for risk regulation. For example, people will oppose fossilfuel reduction because it is a certain loss even when it avoids an uncertain environmental loss of equal expected value.
Third, reflecting a “myopia bias,” people tend to place more importance on the avoidance of immediate losses than the avoidance of
180
losses in the future, perhaps due to the previously discussed availa181
Again,
bility heuristic and their inability to imagine future losses.
this bias will influence people to choose to avoid immediate losses
174

See Dan M. Kahan et al., The Second National Risk and Culture Study: Making
Sense of—and Making Progress in—the American Culture War of Fact 4 (Oct. 3, 2007)
(unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1017189.
175
Id. at 3.
176
See id. at 16 (“[B]ecause of the decisive influence of their worldviews on their
risk perceptions, . . . people end up drawn into divisive forms of cultural conflict . . . .”).
177
See Rachlinski, supra note 171, at 307 (noting that people are “relatively unwilling to sacrifice benefits they already possess to obtain other benefits”).
178
Id. at 308.
179
See id. at 309 (“People are more willing to gamble to avoid a loss than to obtain
a benefit.”).
180
See David A. Dana, A Behavioral Economic Defense of the Precautionary Principle, 97
NW. U. L. REV. 1315, 1324-25 (2003).
181
Id.
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over nonimmediate losses of equal expected value, even taking ac182
count of the time value of money. Accordingly, this bias may lead to
a choice against efficient regulation. Fossil-fuel reduction, for instance, produces immediate economic losses, which are weighed more
183
heavily against future environmental losses of equal expected value.
Agency costs and institutional design that incentivize legislators toward short-term goals may exacerbate such a bias as well.
In short, the theory that temporary legislation is needed as a bulwark against these biases is, at the least, overstated. As the above discussion demonstrates, biased assimilation, loss aversion, and myopia
bias may result in constituents underreacting to new risk. Hence,
these behaviors may result in demand for a level of regulation below
what would be efficient.
C. Determining the Length of Sunset Periods
Finally, the improbability that sunset provisions will produce valuable information or flexible lawmaking opportunities can also be
traced to the difficulty in choosing an appropriate length for the sunset period. Theoretically, the sunset date should occur when a law
begins to produce net costs in light of new information or intervening
184
events. Identifying this point at the time of the sunset’s enactment,
however, will prove challenging, if not prohibitively costly. In contrast,
a legislature can amend or repeal legislation when it no longer pro185
duces net benefits. Such actions may impose greater transaction costs
than sunsetting the law, but these must be weighed against the costs of
the sunset provision: the costs of determining the correct sunset date
and the other legislative burdens discussed throughout this Article.

182

Id. at 1325-26.
See id. (“In theory at least, the myopia bias can be distinguished from the bias in
favor of avoiding sure losses over unsure ones: people may well overweigh immediate
sure losses even as against non-immediate sure losses.”).
184
See Fagan, supra note 10, at 21-22 (“Ceteris paribus, the higher the degree of uncertainty or pace of change, the shorter the sunset clause should be in order to allow
the legislature to implement the maximum amount of new policy options. This flexibility should be weighed against the transaction costs of creating new legislation and
the transaction costs of periodic review.”).
185
See, e.g., supra notes 139-40 and accompanying text (discussing a congressional
amendment to the Immigration and Nationality Act, which lifted a travel ban upon
HIV-positive foreign nationals).
183
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IV. DISADVANTAGES OF TEMPORARY LEGISLATION
The above discussion has questioned the purported advantages of
sunset provisions in producing fiscal prudence, better information,
and legislative flexibility. Recognizing, however, that lasting legislation lacks many of these characteristics as well, this Part continues a
systematic comparison of these two legislative options. In so doing, it
finds severe, albeit sometimes nonobvious, disadvantages of temporary
legislation relative to lasting legislation.
A. Political-Economy Concerns
Prior literature theorizes that temporary legislation may increase
interest-group activity. Generally, public-choice theory posits that small
groups are successful at obtaining legislation because they are more interested and more easily organized than the general public—each
member of which bears only a small cost of the interest-group legisla186
tion. Interest groups compensate legislators for their efforts toward
enactment of the favored policy through campaign contributions,
187
votes, and other benefits, collectively known as “rents.” Scholars (including myself) have argued that temporary legislation, through continual threats of expiration, allows congressional members to extract
188
more rents from interest groups than does lasting legislation.
One critique of this view is that lawmakers can also continually extract rents from interest groups by repeatedly threatening to repeal or
189
alter lasting legislation. To the extent that lawmakers are extracting
rents, however, such threats will not be as forceful as the threat of sunset. It is much easier to let a sunset expire than to repeal or amend
186

See DANIEL A. FARBER & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE 23 (1991)
(explaining how the “free rider” problem allows small interest groups to dominate the
political discourse); William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Independent Judiciary
in an Interest-Group Perspective, 18 J.L. & ECON. 875, 877 (1975) (discussing the negotiation of legislative “deals” between Congress and interest groups); supra notes 149-52
and accompanying text (describing the repeat interactions between interest groups
and legislators in temporary-legislation situations).
187
See Kysar, supra note 8, at 392 (“Through campaign contributions and lobbyists,
these groups seek legislative votes favorable to their interests from politicians.”).
188
See, e.g., id. at 394-95 (noting that legislators are able to provide hope to interest groups when sunset dates approach and thereby can extract rents from both sides);
Edward J. McCaffery & Linda R. Cohen, Shakedown at Gucci Gulch: The New Logic of Collective Action, 84 N.C. L. REV. 1159, 1164-65 (2006) (arguing that Congress helps to
create interest groups that it can later “shake down” for campaign contributions).
189
See Yin, supra note 10, at 243-44 (suggesting that legislators might “enhance the
amount of benefits they obtain from the private sector . . . [by] increas[ing] their use
of threatened, but ultimately unexecuted, legislative actions”).
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legislation. The former requires no action and the latter requires passage in both houses and the signature of the President, not to mention
various internal processes, including committee review, within each
house. The sunset can then be a more viable threat, requiring more
rents to stave off its expiration. For the same reason, reenacting temporary legislation requires more legislative resources and hence more
rents than simply maintaining lasting legislation. The effectiveness of
recurring threats for temporary provisions is supported by anecdotal
evidence from a lobbyist, who stated the following:
Who wants to lose a client? . . . With [temporary tax provisions], you know you
always have someone who will help pay the mortgage. You go to the client, tell
them you’re going to fight like hell for permanent extension, but tell them it’s
a real long shot and that we’ll really be lucky just to get a six-month extension.
Then you go to the Hill and strike a deal for a one-year extension. In the end,
190
your client thinks you’re a hero and they sign on for another year.

Lawmakers similarly benefit from this arrangement. When asked by a
staff member why tax extenders were not made permanent, one Congress member responded,
Are you kidding me? . . . We couldn’t do that! . . . Why, I’d lose all my
friends! . . . Who would come visit me and say kind things to me and do
nice things for me then, if they didn’t have to come back every year to
191
ask for these tax provisions?!!

Because tax extenders benefit lobbyists, who can then justify being
kept on retainer, and congressional members, who can continue to
receive rents, such provisions are particularly susceptible to special interests. One estimate concludes that tax extenders transfer approx192
Indeed, so luimately $30 billion a year to “a few special interests.”
crative is this arrangement that when President Obama proposed in his
2011 budget to make permanent the R&D tax credit, after nearly three
decades of its continuous reenactment, Senate Republicans sent him a
193
letter calling instead for extension and improvement of the credit.
To be sure, it seems reasonable to conclude that interest groups
will value temporary legislation less than lasting legislation due to its

190

Pat Jones, New Day May Dawn for Sunset Tax Provisions, 66 TAX NOTES 1587, 1587
(1995) (internal quotation marks omitted).
191
Martin A. Sullivan, It Is Time to Make All Tax Extenders Permanent, 126 TAX NOTES
139, 141 (2010) (alterations in original).
192
Ryan Grim & Shahien Nasiripour, The K Street Kickback: The Giveaway that Reid
Stripped from the Jobs Bill, HUFFINGTON POST Feb. 12, 2010, http://
www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/02/12/the-K-street-kickback-the_n_460652.html.
193
Id.
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194

shorter duration. However, scholars, including myself, have argued
that campaign finance laws, which limit the amount of contributions a
legislator can receive at a given time, cause legislators to push their
constituents toward temporary legislation, the smoothing effect of
195
Such an analysis therefore
which allows for greater contributions.
adopts an agency-cost model in which agent-legislators, faced with divergent interests from principal-constituents, can exploit the informational asymmetries between themselves and voters, as well as the costs
associated with monitoring legislator behavior, in order to pursue their
196
own interests. Generally, however, under the campaign-finance laws,
a lawmaker can capture more benefits from repeated contributions
under temporary legislation than from one-time contributions.
Some argue, though, that the proper comparison is between the
following two scenarios: (1) continuously sunsetting one piece of leg197
islation and (2) continuously enacting lasting legislation.
The rationale is that there is possibly unlimited demand for legislative prod198
If total future demand for legislation is unlimited, a legislator
uct.
will not restrict legislative product by using temporary legislation in

194

See FRED S. MCCHESNEY, MONEY FOR NOTHING: POLITICIANS, RENT EXTRACPOLITICAL EXTORTION 88 (1997) (reiterating the benefits of longer term
legislation, including better planning ability and reduced transaction costs).
195
See, e.g., Kysar, supra note 8, at 394-95 (maintaining that sunset provisions may
also be used to indirectly avoid campaign-finance limitations); McCaffery & Cohen,
supra note 188, at 1179 (noting that because of campaign-finance limitations, Congress
may prefer to get “paid” by lobbyists over the course of many years).
196
See Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 308-09 & n.10 (1976)
(defining agency costs as consisting of monitoring costs, bonding costs, and losses associated with the agency not working on behalf of the principal). Note that an option
to receive money in the future is not economically equivalent to receiving it up front.
In addition to time-value-of-money considerations that would require future cash flows
to be discounted, a legislator’s tenure may be shorter than the ten years required to
realize the future rents, thereby further discounting the value of future rents. That
being said, high reelection rates drastically reduce this risk. For instance, reelection
rates in the House have averaged at approximately ninety-five percent over the past
twenty years. See Center for Responsive Politics, Reelection Rates Over the Years, OPENSECRETS.ORG, http://www.opensecrets.org/bigpicture/reelect.php (last visited Jan. 15,
2011) (charting reelection rates from 1964 to 2008). Reelection rates for senators during the same time period are a bit lower at approximately eighty-eight percent. Id.
197
See, e.g., Yin, supra note 10, at 243 (noting that legislators can seek rent from
the private sector continually by holding out other legislative product for bargaining in
future congressional sessions).
198
See id. (commenting on the “potentially unlimited demand for legislative product” in future congressional sessions).
TION, AND
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the current term in order to preserve future demand. It is doubtful,
however, that demand for legislative product is unlimited among any
given legislator’s constituency. Instead, each legislator likely has a few
groups, either inside or outside her district, whose interests are strong
200
enough to justify the payment of large-scale rents. Even where there
is demand, perhaps from less powerful interest groups, it is questionable that this demand can produce rents as high as those that the primary lobbying forces in the relevant district pay.
Even where a legislator does not extract rents in the above manner, interest groups may value the recurrent short-term deals of temporary legislation more than the long-term bargains of lasting legislation. For instance, interest groups may avoid registration under the
Lobbying Disclosure Act of 1995 if they do not contribute a threshold
201
If the policy puramount to a lobbyist during a quarterly period.
sued by the interest group is controversial to its shareholders or customers, it may wish to engage in temporary deals with lobbyists and
lawmakers to avoid drawing attention to the issues involved.
Behavioral phenomena may also lead to an increase in the valuation of temporary legislative deals. In a similar situation, many observers criticize corporate management for overemphasizing short202
term earnings. Presumably, this emphasis on the short term occurs
because shareholders lack other methods to evaluate corporate leadership and instead focus on available information, such as quarterly
203
It may also occur due to the myopia bias, discussed
earnings.

199

See id. (“There is no reason for a legislature to place artificial restrictions on
what it can produce in a current session . . . if it knows that there will be more-thansufficient demand at that later time.”).
200
For statistics on campaign contributions by legislator, see Center for Responsive Politics, Congress, OPENSECRETS.ORG, http://www.opensecrets.org/politicians/
index.php (last visited Jan. 15, 2011). My original analysis of 2008 data from the site
concludes that individual senators received on average only 12.28% of their total political action committee (PAC) donations from PACs donating $5000 or more. The average senator received approximately seventeen such donations and the median senator received five such donations.
201
Lobbying Disclosure Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-65, § 4, 109 Stat. 691, 696-97
(codified as amended at 2 U.S.C. § 1603 (2006)).
202
See, e.g., Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Marcel Kahan, A Framework for Analyzing Legal
Policy Towards Proxy Contests, 78 CALIF. L. REV 1071, 1102-03 (1990) (criticizing corporate management’s increase in short-term earnings in order to enhance shareholder
perception as “socially costly” and “myopic”).
203
See id. at 1102 n.107 (“Increasing shareholder support by merely changing
shareholder perceptions is, of course, only possible because shareholders lack perfect
information.”).

KYSAR REVISED FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

Lasting Legislation

2011]

3/14/2011 12:30 PM

1055

204

above, which causes people to avoid current losses over future losses
205
of equal expected value. Many also believe the market for corporate
control, driven by shareholder desire for immediate gratification,
forces managers and directors to magnify the importance of short206
These factors thus may lead businesses to disterm performance.
count excessively future financial benefits while overvaluing those in
the present. To the extent that this theory is true, we can expect entities to value a long-term bargain less than a series of short-term bargains of the same aggregate length. Thus, emphasis upon short-term
profits might lead lawmakers to receive higher rents from temporary
rather than lasting legislation, since people seem to place greater value upon the more immediate benefits of temporary legislation.
Another reason that the use of temporary legislation is uncontroversial may be that long-term legislation carries risks. Scholars have
previously identified three such risks: (1) breach of the “contract” by
the politician responsible for the legislation favoring the private interest, (2) impossibility of performance due to the lawmaker’s failure to
keep office, and (3) an increase in the number of legislative players
207
who must be appeased. Scholars have offered these factors as a partial explanation for the increasing rate of tax changes; essentially, private interests prefer short-term bargains with lawmakers in order to
208
avoid the greater risk that a long-term bargain will fail. One may extend this theory to predict that private interests will prefer a series of
temporary legislative acts rather than lasting legislation (or at least that
204

See supra notes 180-83 and accompanying text (explaining possible sources of
the bias).
205
See Henry T.C. Hu, Risk, Time, and Fiduciary Principles in Corporate Investment, 38
UCLA L. REV. 277, 313 (1990) (describing the belief of some courts that “myopic investors may create pressures on corporations to be correspondingly myopic in their
investment behavior”).
206
See John C. Coffee, Jr., Liquidity Versus Control: The Institutional Investor as Corporate Monitor, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 1277, 1327 & nn.200-01 (1991) (arguing that shareholders often accept unfavorable proposals, like antitakeover proposals, when linked to
short-term “sweeteners,” such as large dividends or stock repurchases); Martin Lipton &
Steven A. Rosenblum, A New System of Corporate Governance: The Quinquennial Election of
Directors, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 187, 210 (1991) (arguing that managers aim to satisfy the
short-term goals of investors and thus underinvest in capital expenditures, research and
development, and new lines of business); cf. Hu, supra note 205, at 314-15, 332-49 (arguing that cognitive biases encourage overinvestment as well as underinvestment).
207
See Richard L. Doernberg & Fred S. McChesney, On the Accelerating Rate and Decreasing Durability of Tax Reform, 71 MINN. L. REV. 913, 945-52 (1987) (noting that longterm taxation contracts are risky because the politician may break his promise, a lawmaker may not be in office for the requisite time period, and ancillary contracts require more players to sign onto the law).
208
Id.
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they will not resist too strongly legislators’ and lobbyists’ attempts to
foist temporary legislation on them in order to extract greater rents).
Relatedly, actors may be wary of supporting lasting legislation for
fear that its costs will outweigh their own ability to utilize long-term
benefits, either because they are no longer necessary or because they
become antithetical to their future priorities. Jonathan Macey has
theorized that interest groups will favor narrowly tailored, privateinterest-focused legislation but will not support broad constitutional
209
rules, even where they promote rent-seeking. This result ensues because such constitutional rules may provide short-term benefits to the
interest group but may fail to provide benefits in the longer term. By
210
lifting the Rawlsian “veil of ignorance,” temporary provisions become more valuable to players who can be sure that they will use these
paid-for benefits.
B. Entrenchment Issues
A maxim in constitutional law holds that “one legislature may not
211
bind the legislative authority of its successors” —that is to say, legislatures may not entrench their statutes. To the extent that sunset provisions allow an earlier legislature to terminate a statute, causing the law
to revert to its prior incarnation (when the legislature at that time may
not wish it to terminate), sunset provisions can fairly be characterized
212
Yet constitutional law scholars do
as entrenchment mechanisms.
209

See Jonathan R. Macey, Promoting Public-Regarding Legislation Through Statutory
Interpretation: An Interest Group Model, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 223, 246-47 (1986) (using examples from the airline industry to illustrate that “even special interest groups that
might benefit from some specific, discrete legislative wealth transfers are likely to object to general constitutional provisions”).
210
See sources cited supra note 3.
211
United States v. Winstar Corp., 518 U.S. 839, 872 (1996) (citing 1 WILLIAM
BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *84).
212
Compare Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Essay, Legislative Entrenchment: A
Reappraisal, 111 YALE L.J. 1665, 1676-78 (2002) (arguing that sunsets and legislative
entrenchment are constitutionally indistinguishable), with Yair Listokin, Learning
Through Policy Variation, 118 YALE L.J. 480, 536 (2008) (justifying the permissibility of
sunset provisions and the impermissibility of legislative entrenchment on grounds
that “sunsetting . . . enhances efficient policymaking”), and John O. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, Essay, Symmetric Entrenchment: A Constitutional and Normative
Theory, 89 VA. L. REV. 385, 444 (2003) (distinguishing sunset provisions from entrenching provisions on the grounds that “[s]unset provisions raise none of the special problems of public choice, aberrational majorities, partisanship, or imperfect
psychological heuristics,” but noting that “an excessive use of sunset provisions might
impose undue costs on future legislatures”). For a general discussion on the entrenchment prohibition, see Julian N. Eule, Temporal Limits on the Legislative Mandate: En-
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not attack sunset provisions on these grounds even though they bind
future majorities by crowding out the legislative agendas of future
213
For instance, one study undertaken even prior to the
Congresses.
dramatic increase in the use of sunset provisions concluded that temporary legislation significantly constrained the agendas of fifty-six per214
cent of committee chairs.
Specifically, temporary legislation may interfere with the future
215
majority’s ability to set its own agenda in the following manner: if
the current legislature passes temporary laws, then the future legislature must consider those it wishes to continue and perhaps devote
216
some legislative resources to debating those it would like to let lapse.
trenchment and Retroactivity, 1987 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 379, 381, which argues that the
prohibition against entrenching enactments relates to a “temporal delegation of authority conferred by periodic elections.”
213
See Gersen, supra note 10, at 281-82 (positing that “temporary legislation transfers the power of agenda control from the Congressional leadership in future Congresses to the current-period legislature” since “[s]tatutory expirations constrain the
discretion of committee chairs by mandating that certain items be placed on the committee’s agenda”).
214
See Christine DeGregorio, Leadership Approaches in Congressional Committee Hearings, 45 W. POL. Q. 971, 978 (1992) (reporting that committee chairs in the study felt
that the review of expiring legislation, or the “reauthorization imperative,” detracted
from the time dedicated to other matters in hearings).
215
Transaction costs of temporary legislation, if higher than those of lasting legislation, may also unduly burden future legislatures. It is difficult, however, to arrive at a
general conclusion regarding the costs of each. There are two types of legislative
transaction costs: costs incurred when the legislation is enacted, or “enactment costs,”
and costs arising postenactment from efforts to lobby for or against repeals or amendments, or “maintenance costs.” See Gersen, supra note 10, at 262-66 (analyzing and
comparing the different levels of enactment and maintenance costs for both temporary and permanent legislation).
Initial enactment costs for lasting and temporary legislation may be equal because
both types have to meet the same procedural requirements; it is more plausible, however, that temporary legislation has lower initial enactment costs because it tends to
incite less political resistance. Id. at 263-64. Reenactment costs are greater for temporary legislation since lasting legislation does not result in such costs at all. Id. at 263.
As for maintenance costs, it is easier to block repeal of legislation than to renew
expiring provisions, especially on a continuous basis. Id. at 264. Accordingly, if renewal is the goal at sunset, then lasting legislation is less costly than temporary legislation. Id. at 264-65. Opponents of temporary legislation will not fight for repeal when
it is far easier to block reenactment at the sunset date; this dynamic is especially true
for shorter sunsets, when the opportunity to block reenactment is near and the disadvantages of keeping the legislation are few. Id. at 265. Accordingly, some temporary
legislation will have lower maintenance costs than lasting legislation. It is therefore
difficult to conclude, from a theoretical perspective, which type of legislation is less
costly to produce and maintain.
216
Note that this entrenchment result would also ensue if the legislature did not
pass any legislation. The discussion at hand, however, is focused on the choice between lasting and temporary legislation.
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If instead the current legislature had passed lasting legislation, the future legislature would need to consider seriously only those provisions
it wishes to repeal or amend.
In this manner, the default result of lasting legislation is simply
continued legislation. By contrast, the default result of temporary leg217
islation is “delegislation,” an arguably more disruptive consequence
due to entrenchment concerns. This is because a sunset provision
causes the law to return to its presunset state—that is, to return to the
policy choices of prior “generations” of lawmakers.
It is unclear whether a future majority will wish for termination of
a past majority’s policy as opposed to continuation. It is plausible that
a future majority would favor the policies of the most recent generation of lawmakers over the policies of past generations. If so, the future majority would more often choose continuation over repeal.
This hypothesis has some support in the law and economics literature, which theorizes that the common law trends toward efficient
218
outcomes over time. Some economists have applied this theory to
219
statutory law as well.
If a future majority indeed prefers the policies of recent generations, then sunset provisions may more deeply entrench the current
majority than lasting legislation by flooding the legislative calendar
220
with bills to reenact the expiring legislation. Moreover, it would be
reasonable to assume that temporary legislation is easier to enact be221
If so, the supply of temcause it facilitates legislative compromise.
217

The term “delegislation” is used here because sunsetting has a valence in favor
of the expiration of legislation, given the difficulty to get Congress to act. The legislation itself, however, could have any content—it could be deregulatory legislation that
expires. In such a case, the expiration of a sunset provision would lead to reregulation rather than deregulation.
218
See, e.g., George L. Priest, The Common Law Process and the Selection of Efficient
Rules, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 65, 65 (1977) (setting forth an early claim that the common law
creates efficient rules).
219
See, e.g., Jürgen Backhaus, Efficient Statute Law (showing that statutory law, under certain circumstances, arrives at efficient outcomes), in ESSAYS IN LAW AND ECONOMICS 23, 25-28 (Michael Faure & Roger Van den Bergh eds., 1989).
220
See Yin, supra note 10, at 248-52 (discussing whether sunset provisions would
“giv[e] each generation a freer hand in setting its own agenda”).
221
Of course, there are other means to achieve compromise. To illustrate, the
estate-tax repeal could have been enacted as a lasting tax cut, with a higher exemption
level, rather than as a temporary repeal. Nonetheless, the temporariness was another
means by which legislators could win the median voter’s support. The political rhetoric against the “death tax” meant that even temporary repeal was preferable to a
compromise on exemption levels. See GRAETZ & SHAPIRO, supra note 49, at 5-10, 26061 (chronicling the events that spurred legislative action to repeal the “death tax” and
analyzing why the political movement for repeal was successful).
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porary legislation may increase over time, thereby further burdening
the legislative calendar.
Such legislative business hence has the potential to “crowd[] out”
222
the agenda of the future legislature.
Additionally, when the future
legislature permits a law to expire, it will likely have to adopt a new law
to avoid the imposition of obsolete policies of prior generations, thus
223
further burdening the new agenda.
Suppose that Congress enacted temporary tax legislation that repealed the estate tax only during 2010, whereas previously the exclu224
sion amount for estates was $1 million. Further suppose that, close
to the sunset date, December 31, 2010, a majority of Congress concluded that a $3.5 million exclusion amount was the optimal tax. The
tax, however, would revert to the original $1 million exclusion amount
if “veto gates,” or procedural obstacles to legislation, prevented
amendment. In such a case, assume that the expired legislation, which
eliminated the estate tax, is more desirable than the older exclusion
amount of $1 million, since a $3.5 million exemption level effectively
exempts most estates from the estate tax. Given the procedural difficulty of renewing the temporary repeal or enacting new legislation
with a $3.5 million exclusion amount, however, a sunset provision may
force the reinstatement of the less desirable outcome.
Moreover, if a majority of Congress prefers the extension of the
repeal, as opposed to the older law establishing an exclusion amount
of $1 million, it may find that the sunset date reduces the flexibility it
has in deciding when to address the issue. For instance, suppose congressional members planned in 2010 to renew the repeal in the fall of
that year. In the aftermath of a hypothetical terrorist attack in that
year, however, further assume that Congress must also enact complex
antiterrorism legislation in that time frame. Because of limited legislative resources, members of Congress may find it difficult to devote
sufficient resources to both issues.
Nevertheless, it is difficult to conclude with certainty that temporary legislation impermissibly entrenches the current majority. The
222

Yin, supra note 10, at 251.
Id. at 252.
224
I abstract this hypothetical, although altered, from current events. See, e.g.,
I.R.C. § 2010(c) (2006) (raising the estate-tax exclusion amount, in phased-in increments, from $1 million in 2002 to $3.5 million in 2009). Compare Economic Growth
and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act, Pub. L. No. 107-16, § 501, 115 Stat. 38, 69 (2001)
(codified as amended at I.R.C. § 2210 (2006)) (repealing the estate tax in 2010), with
id. § 901 (sunsetting such repeal after just one year, after which the estate-tax exclusion
amount would return to 2000 levels).
223
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entrenchment concerns outlined above are based upon a controversial premise—that the policy preferences of an immediately prior
generation are preferable to the ones of generations ago. Even if one
agrees that the common law becomes increasingly efficient, many
proponents of this view have argued that statutory law is less likely to
follow this course because legislators, unlike judges, are less insulated
225
Such groups tend to advocate for their own
from interest groups.
226
agenda rather than for the efficient outcome.
Moreover, the prior congressional decision to sunset the laws may
be said to reflect the preferences of that generation. Thus, even if the
future Congress prefers the policies of the previous Congress, such
policies include the decision to sunset a law. It may therefore be useful
to draw a distinction between temporary legislation intended by the
previous Congress to be temporary at the outset and legislation
enacted in temporary form solely for budget purposes but intended to
be permanently renewed. For example, a short-term stimulus provision, such as a tax holiday, may be less offensive from an entrenchment perspective than the continually renewed R&D credit.
Furthermore, temporary legislation may reduce entrenchment
concerns. Lasting legislation also entrenches, to an extent, the preferences of the current majority because it is continually in effect until a
future Congress expends the resources to repeal it—a costly endeavor.
Relatedly, one can also see temporary legislation as decreasing the
current majority’s influence by creating greater risks that the legislation will be altered through the future majority’s failure to reenact, a
proposition made likely by the procedural difficulty in passing legislation. Temporary legislation may also provide a means by which the
227
For instance, the conlater Congress can pursue its own agenda.
stant need to pass a tax-extenders bill provides the future Congress
with a vehicle to which it can attach other tax items, giving members
228
more opportunities to logroll their preferences.
225

See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 560 (7th ed. 2007)
(“Although the correlation is far from perfect, judge-made rules [i.e., common law
rules] tend to be efficiency-promoting while those made by legislatures . . . tend to be
efficiency-reducing.”).
226
Id. at 560-61.
227
See, e.g., Gersen, supra note 10, at 282 (acknowledging that insertion of sunset
provisions creates “the risk that future legislatures will change the substance of legislation”).
228
For example, at the beginning of 2010, Republican senators attached retroactive reenactment of expired extenders to their version of a jobs bill. See Christine Grimaldi, Grassley to Move Delayed Tax Extenders as Alternative or Amendments to Jobs Bill, 29
DAILY TAX REP., Feb. 16, 2010, at G-2; see also Grim & Nasiripour, supra note 192 (quot-

KYSAR REVISED FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2011]

Lasting Legislation

3/14/2011 12:30 PM

1061

One could further argue that each generation should be freed
from the obligations prioritized by prior generations and that sunset
provisions effectuate that result. Congressional commitment to Social
Security in the 1930s surely has limited the legislative options available
to subsequent Congresses. Although this argument seems intuitively
correct, in this case the alternative option—to sunset Social Security
after, say, ten years—seems nonsensical. Social Security would not
function as a retirement vehicle if people could not rely upon its continuance. A sunset provision would signal that the legislature was not
committed to the long-term survival of the legislation, hence dooming
it. It is the public’s reliance interest (which is necessary to the success
of the legislation), not the lack of a sunset, that creates the primary
entrenching effect of this hypothetical.
Because both temporary and lasting legislation have entrenching
qualities as well as countervailing features, the difficulty lies in determining when the level of entrenchment of each becomes impermissi229
Michael Klarman identifies a distinction “between today’s mable.
jority exercising sovereignty over the present in a way that unavoidably
affects the future and today’s majority seeking direct control over the
future in a manner that is unnecessary to implementing its complete
230
Klarman concludes that, because the
control over the present.”
“burden of inertia in repealing existing legislation is [an] unavoidable
consequence of a present generation’s right to control the present,”
231
The alternative—a requirement
such entrenchment is permissible.
that all legislation be temporary—would simply favor delegislation
due to inertia and procedural hurdles, continuing to entrench the
current majority as discussed above.
Nonetheless, the two types of legislation may not have equal entrenching qualities. Using Klarman’s distinction, such qualities in
lasting legislation appear to be more necessary to implement the current majority’s control over the present. For instance, the entrenching a senior research associate at the Tax Policy Center as stating that the annual need
to reenact extenders can be a “useful political vehicle” to which to add pet projects because “[t]hese are considered must-pass bills”).
229
Cf. Christopher Serkin, Public Entrenchment Through Private Law: Binding Local
Governments, 78 U. CHI. L. REV. (forthcoming 2011) (manuscript at 8) (on file with author) (arguing that because entrenchment exists along “a continuum,” one must answer the more difficult question of “when should entrenchment be allowed”).
230
Michael J. Klarman, Majoritarian Judicial Review: The Entrenchment Problem, 85
GEO. L.J. 491, 505 (1997); see also CALABRESI, supra note 157, at 59-65 (exploring alternative ways in which legislators can identify and remedy laws that need reworking or
reconsideration).
231
Klarman, supra note 230, at 505 n.66.
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ment qualities in lasting legislation allow the government to make a
credible commitment to persons who can then rely on that promise.
In this manner, lasting legislation may reduce the costs of some gov232
The entrenchment feaernment contracts by promoting stability.
tures of lasting legislation also make government itself more stable by
233
reducing volatility in the law. Madison seemed to support this view
and wrote that, as a sunset date nears, “all the rights depending on
positive laws, that is, most of the rights of property . . . become absolutely defunct, and the most violent struggles ensue between the parties interested in reviving, and those interested in reforming the an234
tecedent state of property.”
In contrast, temporary legislation attempts no commitment whatsoever to an intended legislative outcome, other than reversion to prior
law. The entrenchment features of temporary legislation, however, do
provide benefits. They may allow Congress to control the transition
costs of future policy changes. By ascertaining a relatively certain point
at which Congress will contemplate a modification to the current legal
regime, the objects of the legislation may thus better anticipate the tim235
Here again, though, we might distinguish being of such change.
tween legislation intended to be truly temporary and legislation enacted
in temporary form solely for budget purposes. The latter category presumably does not assist Congress in dampening transition costs since
Congress does not intend the legislation to be temporary.
Additionally, the latter category more likely sustains excessive interest-group influence across time since it is not responding to a particular event or emergency around which interest groups can coa232

See Posner & Vermeule, supra note 212, at 1670-73 (discussing the advantages of
legislation that results in entrenchment).
233
Id. at 1672.
234
Id. at 1671 (quoting Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Feb. 4,
1790), reprinted in THE MIND OF THE FOUNDER: SOURCES OF THE POLITICAL THOUGHT
OF JAMES MADISON 230, 232 (Marvin Meyers ed., 1973)).
235
See Gersen, supra note 10, at 275 n.107 (“Because sunsetting tax provisions do
not give rise to the same expectations of permanence, they may mitigate problems
associated with transition policy in the tax realm.”). See generally DANIEL SHAVIRO,
WHEN RULES CHANGE (2000) (combining economics and political science to devise a
working framework under which transition policy can best be effectuated in the federal income tax system); Michael J. Graetz, Legal Transitions: The Case of Retroactivity in
Income Tax Revision, 126 U. PA. L. REV. 47 (1977) (exploring how the effective dates of
changes in income tax laws impact wealth, and arguing against grandfathered effective dates); Louis Kaplow, An Economic Analysis of Legal Transitions, 99 HARV. L. REV.
509 (1986) (arguing for an efficiency model of legal transitions and contending that
the market, not the government, should rectify losses incurred by a party as a result of
changes in public policy).
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lesce. This problem is compounded by the fact that benefits related
to temporary legislation’s ability to signal policy change may also accrue problematically to interest groups—at the expense of the public.
A primary fear of entrenchment is that a minority group may successfully influence legislation into the future, thereby burdening unorga236
Lasting legislation, however, protects against this
nized majorities.
prospect to some degree. By making it difficult to identify precisely
future beneficiaries and harmed parties, lasting legislation places interest groups in a state akin to the original position, behind the Rawl237
In contrast, because temporary legislation
sian “veil of ignorance.”
signals when the policy will change, the ability of private parties to
identify the winners and losers will heighten, thus increasing the
supply of private-regarding legislation. Moreover, the use of temporary legislation is elective in the sense that current lawmakers and interest groups can choose which legislation has a sunset as well as the
length of the sunset period.
To summarize, it is clear that both temporary and lasting legislation produce entrenchment issues. Yet temporary legislation, especially when enacted solely for budget reasons rather than in response
to an emergency or crisis, contains entrenchment features perhaps
more troubling in nature because such legislation tends to lack the
benefits that might otherwise justify such entrenchment.
C. Planning Disruptions
Finally, temporary legislation also complicates planning activities.
First, temporary legislation indicates that Congress is not committed to
the durability of a policy. Lasting legislation, on the other hand, may
function as a precommitment device, such as in our Social Security ex238
ample discussed above, by binding legislators to future obligations.
This ability to precommit is vital to planning the organization of a
complex economy and culture, such as our own, throughout a number of years. The coordination of broad social policies—such as social
security, health care, and employment—across the economy requires
a degree of stability, which varying sunset provisions could disrupt.
For instance, it would be difficult to have planned health care reform
236

See Posner & Vermeule, supra note 212, at 1690 (discussing one scholar’s concerns that when “tax policy was temporarily in the hands of powerful pro-business interest groups,” those interest groups had the opportunity to create laws interfering
with “the power of future majorities” not yet organized).
237
See sources cited supra note 3.
238
See supra Section IV.B.
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without sensing our future commitments to social security. Temporary legislation may therefore stifle legislative ability to engage in longterm planning.
In addition, temporary legislation disrupts the planning activities
of those it impacts. Although citizens should always expect some turmoil in the law, unlike repeal or amendment of laws, sunset provisions
do not require affirmative action by Congress for the law to change.
They thus decrease the durability of the law and increase compliance
239
burdens. For instance, they may incentivize taxpayers to obtain costly
tax advice to shift income and deductions between years in avoidance
240
of a sunset date. Temporary provisions also distort investment deci241
sions.
Indeed, certain publicly traded corporations identify sunsetting tax provisions as material risks to their business. In its annual report to investors, for instance, General Electric disclosed the following
warning in the risk factor section of its filing:
[A beneficial tax provision] is scheduled to expire at the end of 2008,
has been scheduled to expire on four previous occasions, and each time
it has been extended by Congress. If this provision is not extended, the
current U.S. tax imposed on active financial services income earned outside the United States would increase, making it more difficult for U.S.
242
financial services companies to compete in global markets.

Some have suggested that, to ameliorate this problem, Congress
could vote early to extend temporary legislation, thereby easing the
243
Unfortunately,
transition for taxpayers and other affected parties.
239

Of course, some areas of law, like taxation, experience immense change even
when enacted as lasting legislation. See Yin, supra note 10, at 232-33 (discussing the
numerous changes to tax legislation since the 1950s); see also Doernberg & McChesney,
supra note 207, at 923-24 (explaining the accelerating rate of tax reform and change).
That is not to say, however, that such legislative change would be no greater with temporary legislation.
240
NAT’L TAXPAYER ADVOCATE, supra note 36, at 405. For instance, concern about
the continuation of the AMT “patch” has caused tax advisors to recommend bunching
certain expenditures into a year in which the patch is certain to apply, thus ensuring
their deductibility. Id.
241
See Edward Kleinbard, The Congress Within the Congress: How Tax Expenditures
Distort Our Budget and Our Political Processes, TAX NOTES TODAY, May 17, 2009, available
at LEXIS, 2009 TNT 94-40 (discussing the underinvestment in alternative energy due
to the temporariness of the tax subsidies supporting such energy initiatives). It is unclear whether temporary provisions uniformly increase or decrease investment. See
Yin, supra note 9, at 244-48. However, none dispute that they distort investment. Of
course, both over- and underinvestment will result in inefficiencies.
242
GENERAL ELECTRIC CO., GE ANNUAL REPORT 2007, at 81 (2007).
243
See, e.g., Yin, supra note 10, at 233 (“By taking explicit, ‘early’ action on a future
expiration, Congress would . . . send an especially strong message of an intention for
stability in the law.”).
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Congress already has tremendous difficulty with renewing the extenders and thereby cannot ensure seamless renewal on time, let alone ear244
ly. Often Congress passes the extenders, such as the R&D tax credit,
245
late so that they have retroactive effective dates. Such retroactive renewals create heavy administrative costs to taxpayers and may even
246
Furthermore, taxpayers may
jeopardize financing arrangements.
decide to increase recordkeeping in the hopes that a lapsed tempo247
rary provision will be retroactively renewed.
One should consider
such planning difficulties in the assessment of temporary legislation.
V. RECOMMENDATION
In light of the aforementioned critiques of temporary legislation,
lasting legislation should be the statutory norm. Specifically, this Article aims to attune legislative actors to the problems of temporary legislation so that its passage is cautiously informed and carefully considered. This Article therefore recommends a policy presumption
against temporary legislation and in favor of lasting legislation. Recognizing that a legislative rule formalizing such a presumption would
itself be endogenous and hence vulnerable to intense congressional
pressures to revise any such statement (due to pressures to spend),
248
this Article instead seeks to change underlying congressional norms.
It challenges favorable accounts of temporary legislation by construct-

244

See Betty M. Wilson, TEI Testimony at Finance Committee Hearing on Tax Code Complexity, TAX NOTES TODAY, Apr. 26, 2001, available at LEXIS, 2001 TNT 82-58 (labeling
extenders as “on-again, off again” provisions).
245
See, e.g., David L. Cameron, Research Tax Credit: Statutory Construction, Regulatory
Interpretation and Policy Incoherence, 9 COMP. L. REV. & TECH. J. 63, 66 n.7 (2004) (listing
the legislative history of the R&D tax credit).
246
See NAT’L TAXPAYER ADVOCATE, supra note 36, at 405 (detailing how late-year
tax-law changes burden both public and private actors since the IRS may not have time
to revise its forms, tax preparation software companies may not be able to update their
products, and taxpayers may not be able to adjust their activities to take advantage of
tax benefits).
247
For instance, the R&D tax credit does not apply to expenses incurred between
June 30, 1995, and July 1, 1996, because the legislature did not retroactively extend the
credit. Cameron, supra note 245, at 66 n.7.
248
In so doing, this Article does not reject the ability of legislative rules to register
and reinforce norms but instead posits that due to their endogeneity, legislative rules
must be supported by such norms to avoid instability and gamesmanship. One could
argue, for example, that Congress enacts legislative rules as statutes, rather than as
simple resolutions in each House, as a symbolic indication of strong congressional
support of the behavioral limits therein.
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ing a model of the legislative process, thereby informing the beliefs of
249
lawmakers and their constituents.
The policy presumption against temporary legislation will be
stronger as applied to tax cuts. Sunset provisions enacted in the tax
legislative context are typically meant to address revenue concerns ra250
ther than to impart legislative flexibility.
Hence, temporary taxrelief provisions more readily produce the pathologies in the political
process outlined above. Such sunset provisions, lacking a traditional
policy justification, do not have a natural end date. This attribute
creates substantial uncertainty regarding the sunset date and therefore causes planning disruptions. Lawmakers and lobbyists will also
more easily pursue and exploit the continued reenactment of such
temporary legislation as a result of the disconnect between the sunset
date and any factor external to the budget process, which would otherwise limit the length of renewal. Moreover, because such sunset
provisions are not enacted for legislative review or in response to a
particular event, it is more likely that the future Congress will not see
its role as meaningful at the sunset date and that the enacting Congress will not reap the benefits that entrenchment offers. Nonetheless, the later Congress will expend its precious resources reenacting
the legislation, thereby supplanting its own legislative agenda.
At times, however, it may be necessary to employ temporary legis251
lation. In crisis situations, for example, temporary legislation will
likely help to build coalitions quickly, to provide a check on a legislature in dealing with hurriedly drafted and enacted legislation, and to
return automatically the statutory scheme to the status quo once the
252
Additionally, when Congress intends to
emergency has dissipated.
legislate in an experimental manner, temporary legislation may be

249

Therefore, implicit within this Article’s recommendation is the view that the
preferences of congressional members encompass their own ideologies and those of
their constituents, in addition to the goal of accumulating rents. See supra note 152
and accompanying text (positing that public-choice theory must consider the ideological preferences of lawmakers).
250
Congress makes some tax cuts temporary to respond to emergencies. However,
these are vastly overshadowed by tax cuts made temporary for other reasons, such as
budgetary or interest-group pressures. See STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, supra
note 6, at 2-16 (listing 179 expiring general tax provisions and only 22 expiring disaster-relief tax provisions).
251
Crisis situations may be natural or manmade, thus including earthquakes, financial downturns, and terrorist acts.
252
See Fagan, supra note 10, at 32-40 (describing the leniency that is afforded to
the enactment of temporary, emergency legislation throughout American history).
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253

appropriate. In these instances, the presumption against temporary
254
legislation should be relaxed.
In dealing with a crisis situation, a legislature is more likely to identify better the appropriate breadth and length of the sunset by keying
its terms to the emergency event. Emergency sunset provisions are less
likely to entrench the legislature since there is less need to renew or
revisit the issue—and thus less concern about the crowding out of future policy items. Additionally, a continued coalescence of interest
groups will be more difficult to sustain once the emergency passes.
Finally, a defined, precipitating factor will create more certainty regarding the sunset date and will therefore ease planning considerations. Nonetheless, the story of the tax extenders should serve as a
cautionary tale. Although legitimate pressures may produce temporary legislation, more nefarious forces may lobby successfully for its
255
Without meaningful review, such legislation, like a
continuance.
phoenix, will be renewed perpetually from the ashes.

253

An alternative way of categorizing acceptable uses of temporary legislation is
when lawmakers originally intend the legislation to be temporary, as opposed to permanent. See supra notes 225-27 and accompanying text.
254
An example of when Congress used temporary legislation in response to a crisis
is the antiterrorist legislation known as the USA PATRIOT Act, passed in response to
the attacks on the United States in September 2001, with the goal of expanding the
investigatory power of law enforcement, the discretion of authorities to detain and deport suspected terrorists, and the ability of the Treasury Department to regulate suspicious financial transactions. See Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT ACT)
Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8, 15, 18, 22, 31, 42, 49, and 50 U.S.C.). Many of its provisions were subject to
a four-year sunset period, id. § 224(a), 115 Stat. at 295, because of concerns over civil
liberties threatened by the Act.
255
Perhaps avoiding such failures in the use of sunset provisions, Bruce Ackerman
has proposed the adoption of an emergency statute, termed an “emergency constitution,” in which Congress bestows upon the executive the unilateral power to declare an
emergency. Bruce Ackerman, Essay, The Emergency Constitution, 113 YALE L.J. 1029,
1047-49 (2004). This delegation would expire, however, within two weeks of the emergency, unless a majority vote in both houses permits otherwise. Id. Reauthorization
would then require escalating supermajority votes every two months. Id. at 1049. As a
framework statute, this type of legislation prescribing sunset provisions would likely
be more successful than adding sunset provisions to specific types of legislation at the
height of the crisis. Id. at 1048-49. Because the legislation is procedural and anticipatory in nature, Congress could adopt it behind a quasi–veil of ignorance, thus reducing the opportunities to sunset with the purpose of extracting rents or other selfdealing. Id. at 1048. However, a procedural sunset provision may be overly broad, encompassing inappropriate situations. Moreover, escalating supermajority requirements may require too many legislative resources upon each reauthorization.
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CONCLUSION
In summary, this Article has argued that temporary legislation
lacks many of the benefits that recent scholarship claims. Proponents
of temporary legislation have contended that it enhances fiscal responsibility because its official-cost estimates reflect the full cost of
such legislation, unlike official-cost estimates of lasting legislation,
which do not reflect costs beyond the budget window. However, many
factors—the endogeneity of the budget process that leads to shifting
baselines, PAYGO exceptions, the many costs that temporary legislation
engenders beyond the budget window, and the inability of lawmakers to
consider the full cost of all types of legislation—thwart the alleged restraining effect of temporary legislation. What is more, sunset provisions tend not to provide lawmakers with enhanced information or flexibility: ex ante, lawmakers will likely be unable to determine the
appropriateness of the sunset, as well its proper scope and length.
Finally, in addition to lacking the advantages that other scholars
assert, sunset provisions have deleterious effects on the public and
private sectors. Specifically, their use increases the offer and extraction of rents from interest groups, entrenches current majoritarian
preferences, and complicates the planning activities of those affected.
For these reasons, this Article advances a policy presumption against
temporary legislation and in favor of lasting legislation. Doing so
necessarily places trust in most cases (at least compared with the alternative of temporary legislation) in the constitutional process by
which our legislature can amend or repeal a law in a deliberative
manner. Heretofore, this architecture has ensured a statutory scheme
that has adapted over time to remarkably changing environs. It has
created lasting, yet living, legislation.

